Taheri asks Reid, To Whom Will You Surrender?

Amir Taheri has a cutting essay today on Harry Reid and his impact on the war debate.

Without meaning to do so, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid has pushed the debate on Iraq in a new direction. Reid claims that the war is lost and that the United States has already been defeated. By advancing the claim, Reid has moved the debate away from the initial antiwar obsession with the legal and diplomatic controversies that preceded it.

At the same time, Reid has parted ways with Democratic leaders such as Sen. Hillary Clinton, who supported the war but who now claims that its conduct has been disastrous. What they mean, by implication, is that a Democratic president would do better than George W. Bush and win the war. Reid's new position, however, means that even a Democratic president wouldn't be able to ensure a U.S. victory in Iraq. For him, Iraq is irretrievably lost.

Some antiwar analysts have praised Reid for what they term "his clarity of perception." A closer examination, however, would show that Reid might have added to the confusion that has plagued his party over the issue from the start.

Because all wars have winners and losers, Reid, having identified America as the loser, is required to name the winner. This Reid cannot do.

The reason is that, whichever way one looks at the situation, America and its Iraqi allies remain the only objective victors in this war.

Reid cannot name al Qaeda as the winner, because the terror organization has failed to achieve any of its objectives. It hasn't been able to halt the process of democratization, marked by a string of elections, and it has failed to destroy the still fragile institutions created in the post-Saddam era. Al Qaeda is also suffering from increasing failure to attract new recruits, while coming under pressure from Iraqi Sunni Arab tribes, especially west of the Euphrates.

. . . What about the remnants of the Saddamite regime? Can Reid name them as victors? Hardly. . . .

Reid may believe that Iran, either alone or with its Syrian Sancho Panza, is the victor. If that's the case, Reid shares the illusion peddled by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Convinced that the Americans will run away, mostly thanks to political maneuvers by Reid and his friends, Ahmadinejad has gone on the offensive in Iraq and throughout the region. By heightening his profile, he wants to make sure that Iran reaps the fruits of what Reid is sowing in Washington.

But even then, it's unlikely that most Iraqis would acknowledge Ahmadinejad as winner and bow to his diktat. The Islamic Republic cannot act as victor solely because Reid says so.

It's possible that Reid imagined that his analytical problems are over simply because he has identified the war's loser. The truth is that his troubles are only beginning. He must tell Americans to whom they wish their army to surrender in Iraq.

That Reid is desperately trying to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory isn't surprising. His party requires an American defeat in Iraq in order to win the congressional and presidential elections next year. . . .

Read the whole article here. Even as events are advancing for the better in Iraq, fully 55% of Americans polled by the WSJ now believe that victory is not possible in Iraq. It is incredibly disheartening. What happens between now and September is crucial. American's had every right to demand much more from our government. By any measure, the Bush administration followed a magnificent military campaign with fumbling to a degree usually only seen in a Three Stooges short. But the Iraq of today is a far different animal then it was on election day last year, and I question just how many Americans want to embrace defeat in Iraq, with all the ramifications thereof, just to punish Bush or to reward the far left.

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Amir Taheri on Politics, Pakistani Style

Amir Taheri weighs in on the choice immediately facing Pakistani President Musharraf - whether to rely on Islamist parties for support or to allow secular democratic opposition to rebuild:

AS NATO forces prepare to face a massive "spring offensive" by the Taliban in Afghanistan, policymakers may be ignoring a greater threat looming in Pakistan.

. . . But, while Afghanistan is vaccinated against Talibanization, Pakistan is not.

Islamist parties sympathetic to the Taliban already control the regional government in the Northwest Frontier, one of Pakistan's four provinces, and have a foothold in the administration of another, Balochistan. Of greater concern, however, is the heightened profile of Taliban-style groups in Punjab and Sind, two provinces that account for 80 percent of the country's population.

Two factors explain the rise of Taliban-style groups in Pakistan.

The first is President Pervez Musharraf's semi-official alliance with Islamist parties that, though not as radical as the Taliban, have worked hard to increase the role of religion in the nation's politics. By imposing religion as a measure of all things, they have enabled hard-line elements to pose as the sole true custodians of Islam.

The second factor is Musharraf's refusal to allow Pakistan's moderate parties to rebuild themselves under leaders of their choice. These parties were severely restricted, and their top leaders chased out of the country, when Musharraf seized power in a bloodless coup in 1999.

The elimination of the mainstream parties led to a paradoxical situation - in which a general who takes the secular Turkish republic as his model found himself allied to Islamists of various shades.

. . . Yet the Musharraf presidency is fast approaching a fork in the road. In one direction lies the path to tighter military rule backed by obscurantist religious parties ready to sacrifice political and social freedoms at the altar of a narrow vision of Islam. The other direction points to a genuine democratization that could immunize Pakistan against all forms of Talibanization.

The moment of choice will come later this year, when Pakistan is to hold a general election.

The question is whether Musharraf will allow the mainstream, non-Islamist parties to reorganize freely and enter the election with leaders of their own choice.

In recent weeks, several countries (including the United Sates, Britain and Saudi Arabia) have worked behind the scenes to broker a deal between Musharraf and party leaders in exile.

If my sources are right, an agreement is in the making between Musharraf and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

As leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Bhutto is arguably the strongest democratic figure in her nation's politics. Last week's decision by a court to throw out trumped-up charges of corruption against her could facilitate her return from exile. And that is certain to boost the chances of mainstream forces defeating the Islamists in a straight electoral contest. . . .

Continue reading here.

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Taheri on Egyptian Constitutional Reforms

Egypt is an ally of the United States, the first Arab country to make peace with Israel, and a dictitorial regime run under martial law for over 25 years since the murder of Anwar Sadat by a group of islamists that included amongst its number the current al Qaeda number 2 man, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Egypt's president since Sadat's death, Hosni Mubarak, has resisted democratic reforms, largely arguing that a democratic election would see Egypt come under the control of Islamists. Egypt's government today is authoritarian and nominally secular, and it is a government that significantly curtails freedom of speech. (See here)

Now, the 80 year old Mubarak is in an end game, trying to force through constitutional reforms that will end martial law, that may set the stage for a pluarlistic democracy, and that will outlaw political participation by any religious party. The largest such party in Egypt today is the century old Muslim Brotherhood. (For background information on the Muslim Brotherhood and MAS in the US, see here)

As Taheri explains:

The proposed reforms are certainly significant, partly rewriting or totally replacing 34 articles of the Constitution.

On the positive side, they would end the state of emergency under which Egypt has lived since President Anwar Sadat's assassination a quarter-century ago. On the negative side, the changes could pave the way for draconian laws to limit political freedom in the name of counterterrorism.

While secularist and liberal opposition groups have criticized the proposed reforms as a step away from democratization, the most determined opposition has come from the Muslim Brotherhood, a semiclandestine fraternity that won 88 seats in the 454-seat National Assembly in 2005.

The proposed reforms target the Muslim Brotherhood in two ways:

* They would make it illegal for any political party or group to be based on religion, forcing the Brotherhood to drop the word "Muslim" from its name and its old slogan, "Islam is the Solution."

* They would enable the government to stop the Brotherhood and similar Islamist organizations raising funds and establishing welfare networks as a means of recruiting members. The authorities may use the new constitutional provisions as an excuse to seize the Brotherhood's considerable assets, accumulated over some 80 years of business activities.

Hoping to avoid a ban, the Brotherhood has taken several steps to placate Mubarak. Notably, it has eschewed armed struggle by announcing that the security forces have the right to capture or kill anyone bearing unauthorized arms.

Last week, the Brotherhood swallowed another bitter pill when the government announced that 34 women had been appointed as judges, in direct contravention of Islam's rules. The historic step helps Egypt join the half-dozen Muslim-majority nations where women are admitted into all branches of the judiciary. Despite years of campaigning to drive women out of the judiciary, the Brotherhood has been forced to tone down its criticism of the government's latest move.

Despite the Brotherhood's objections, the idea of banning political parties based on religion appears to have substantial support across Egypt. Mubarak's liberal and leftist critics support the measure because it forces the Brotherhood and other Islamist outfits to fight for votes by offering political programs rather than fomenting religious passions.

The idea that political parties should not be based on religion is gaining ground in much of the Muslim world.

Both Algeria and Tunisia have amended their constitutions to prevent the formation of faith-based parties. Iraq's new democratic constitution also imposes restrictions on the use of religion for party political purposes.

. . . The issue is of greater importance in Egypt, where the Coptic Christian community (some 15 percent of the population) feels specially targeted by the Brotherhood and other Islamist groups.

. . . What is certain, however, is that Mubarak is trying to do all he can to prevent a power grab by the Islamists.

Over the last quarter-century, he has defeated a dozen armed jihadi groups in one of the longest anti-terrorist wars in modern history. He has also all but dismantled the Soviet-style economic system created by Gamal Abdul Nasser, who ruled between 1952 and 1969.

The proposed reforms could include a step backward, if future parliaments allocate unsupervised power to the army and the security services in the name of the War on Terror. Nevertheless, that need not happen - especially if the democratic opposition captures a greater share of the popular vote in future elections.

On balance, the end of the emergency is a positive development, as is the clarification of the relationship between the executive and the legislature. More important, the separation of religion from partisan politics is a step in the right direction. Egypt cannot build a democracy by setting the stage for religious wars.

Those who support democratization in Egypt should give these reforms qualified support - but remain vigilant to ensure free and fair elections in the months and years ahead.

Read the whole article here.

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Taheri on the Perils of Talking with Iran's Theocracy

Iranian journalist Amir Taheri gives a historical reminder to those who call for "talks with Iran" of just how foolish a proposition that is:

[B]ecause the contemporary world has a short memory, most people find the suggestion [to talk with Iran] genial. It is as if no one ever talked to the mullahs before!

The truth, however, is that all powers, including the United States and the European Union, have talked to the mullahs whenever the latter wanted it.

The history of the Khomeinist regime since its inception in 1979 shows that whoever tried to engage in negotiations with the outside world, especially the United States, met with an end that few would envy.

Read the entire article here. It also reminds us just how foolish Jimmy Carter and Zbigniew Bzrezinski truly were.

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An IRGC General Goes Missing & Bad Things Start to Happen for Terhan

Amir Taheri looks at the importance of the defection of Ali-Reza Askari to America and ties it in to a spate of bad events for the Iranian theocracy that have happened of late

'A VERY big fish" - so Tehran sources de scribe former Deputy Defense Minister Ali-Reza Askari (sometimes called "Asghari" in the West), who disappeared in Istanbul on Sunday. Askari's disappearance fits an emerging pattern. Since December, the United States and its allies appear to have moved onto the offensive against the Islamic Republic's networks of influence in the Middle East:

* Jordan has seized 17 Iranian agents, accused of trying to smuggle arms to Hamas, and deported them quietly after routine debriefing.

* A number of Islamic Republic agents have been identified and deported in Pakistan and Tunisia.

* At least six other Iranian agents have been picked up in Gaza, where they were helping Hamas set up armament factories.

* In the past three months, some 30 senior Iranian officials, including at least two generals of Revolutionary Guards, have been captured in Iraq.

All but five of the Islamic Republic agents seized in Iraq appear to have been released. One of those released was Hassan Abbasi, nicknamed "the Kissinger of Islam," who is believed to be President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's strategic advisor.

Among those still held by the Americans is one Muhammad Jaafari Sahraroudi, a senior Revolutionary Guard commander wanted by the Austrian police in connection with the murder of three Iranian Kurdish leaders in Vienna in 1989.

All this looks like a message to Tehran that its opponents may be moving on to the offensive in what looks like a revival of tactics used in the Cold War.

This is all good news. You can read the rest of Mr. Taheri's article here.

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Taheri on the Generals Behind the Surge

Iranian journalist Amir Taheri has an article out today discussing the promising signs of the surge and his belief that the two generals most capable of making the surge a success are there in command -- LTG David Petreaus and his counterpart MG Abboud Qanbar, the Iraqi commander in Baghdad. Read the whole story here.

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U.S. - Iran Conflict is Existential

Amir Taheri has an excellent article analyzing the existential nature of the U.S. Iran conflict.

We are witnessing the start of what could be a long, complicated conflict - not a prelude to the sharp, short exchange that many expect. What is at stake is the future not only of Iran but also of the place of American power in the world. This showdown cannot end without a clear winner and loser.

As Taheri explains:

Fantasists such as Javier Solana, the European Union's ineffective foreign-policy czar, have tried to present the Islamic Republic's uranium-enrichment program as a technical issue. Others, like French President Jacques Chirac, have advised acceptance of what they regard as a fait accompli.

For Ahmadinejad, however, the issue is political in the grand sense of the term - with nothing less at stake than the survival of the Khomeinist regime.

The 1979 revolution had a tripartite slogan: "independence, liberty and Islamic government" - and the regime that emerged tried to build its legitimacy on that basis. Over the last quarter-century, however, it has failed to deliver.

In practical terms, Iran today is more dependent on the outside world than before the Khomeinists seized power. In 1977, Iran imported 11 percent of the food it needed; today, it imports almost half. In 1977, Iran was an overall exporter of crude oil and petroleum products; today, it imports more than 40 percent of its gasoline.

In 1977, there were no outside forces in the Gulf. Today, the United States and its allies control the waterway. Iranian ships passing through the Gulf, and aircraft flying over it, have to clear their routes with the Americans.

As for liberty, most Iranians today know that they are much less free, especially in social and cultural terms, than they were before the mullahs seized power. A recent study by the International Monetary Fund shows Iran experiencing the largest brain-drain of any country in history, largely because the educated elites are fleeing an oppressive atmosphere.

The slogan's third part, Islamic government, has also remained a chimera. Many genuinely religious Iranians, including some Shiite clerics, see Khomeinism as an "evil innovation" (bed'aah) because it violates a fundamental principle of the faith by pretending that it can create a truly Islamic government before the return of the Hidden Imam.

Ahmadinejad is conscious of the Islamic Republic's massive loss of legitimacy in the early 1990s (at least). But he knows that he can't restore it by offering greater liberty: Any loosening of the regime's tight grip on power could open a Pandora's box of political, sectarian and ethnic grievances and demands that no undemocratic regime can deal with.

That leaves the radicals with two options: thickening the Islamic coloring of the regime, and emphasizing its claim of independence.
Ahmadinejad has tried to thicken the regime's religious coloring by casting himself in the role of the proverbial Islamic ghazi (holy warrior) who will ride his white horse into Jerusalem to liberate it from the infidel.

The regime's claim of independence is best illustrated by its refusal to kowtow to the diktats of the major powers, especially the United States. The nuclear program would not have been an issue in Iran just two or three years ago - most Iranians knew nothing of the program and the controversy it had provoked. But today, largely thanks to Ahmadinejad's constant hammering of the theme during his ceaseless provincial tours, most Iranians are familiar with the issue.

And, because Ahmadinejad has presented the dispute as an attempt by the great powers to deny Iran nuclear energy, many Iranians, while suspicious of the regime's motives, nevertheless support its position.
Ahmadinejad's supporters hailed his election as the second Khomeinist revolution, in the hope that the cooling embers of Islamist passion could be fanned again into raging flames. They have promoted such ideas as a "clash of civilizations," in which Khomeinist Iran would provide the hard core of a new Islamic "superpower" to challenge the United States and offer humanity an alternative to the existing international order.

Thanks to Ahmadinejad, the nuclear issue has become a regime-change issue.

If the Khomeinist regime emerges victorious from the current confrontation, it would move to a higher degree of radicalism - thus, in effect, becoming a new regime. The radical faction would be able to purge the rich and corrupt mullahs by promoting a new generation of zealots linked with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and the security services. It would also move onto the offensive in the region, seeking to reshape it after the Khomeinist revolution's geostrategic interests.
If, on the other hand, the regime is forced to back down on this issue, the radical moment would fade, while the many enemies of the regime regroup either to topple it or to change it beyond recognition, as Deng Xiaoping did with China's Maoist regime.

Read the whole story here.

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TAHERI ON THE SYRIA-IRAN ALLIANCE.

What we now witness is the clash of two visions for the Middle East, one represented by the 6+2 bloc, the other by the Islamic Republic in Iran and Syria. The 6+2 bloc hopes to stabilise the region in cooperation with the US and its principal Western allies. The Tehran-Damascus axis, on the other hand, hopes to exclude the US in the context of a broader strategy aimed at turning the Middle East into a base for challenging the American-dominated global system.
. . . .
The kind of Middle East that Khomeinists want is one in which religion is transformed into a political ideology and an instrument of power for the ruling clergy.

Read the whole article.

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AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAN.

Iran cannot allow the imposition of a pax Americana in which Khomeinism could have no place. The US, for its part, cannot allow its Khomeinist foes to dominate a region that contains half the world's oil and gas reserves.

The conventional wisdom is that with the US Army bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington cannot wage full-scale war against the Islamic republic. This ignores the fact that the US Navy and Air Force remain fully free and ready for action. Washington's choice is not limited to either invading Iran or surrendering to the mullahs. Between the two, a range of options is available.

A very good article by Amir Taheri.

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