US Military Maximizing The Opportunity To Meet Allah

The combined arms combat power of the U.S. military, wielded by the most well trained soldiers on this earth, is a wonderful and terrifying thing indeed. And with it, the dynamic in Iraq has just changed 180 degrees. General Petraeus has wasted no time now that all promised troops for the surge are on the ground in Iraq. The mission has now changed from emphasizing the creation of static outposts in Baghdad to large scale offensive operations aimed primarilly at al Qaeda. And as previously predicted, the first big offensive is going into Diyala Province, now the home base of al Qaeda in Iraq. This today from the AP:

About 10,000 U.S. soldiers launched an offensive against al-Qaida in Iraq northeast of Baghdad early Tuesday, killing at least 22 insurgents, the U.S. military said.

The raids, dubbed "Operation Arrowhead Ripper," took place in Baqouba, the capital of Diyala province, and involved air assaults under the cover of darkness, the military said in a statement. The operation was still in its opening stages, it said.

On Monday, military officials said U.S. and Iraqi forces had launched attacks on Baghdad's northern and southern flanks to clear out Sunni insurgents, al-Qaida fighters and Shiite militiamen who had fled the capital and Anbar during a four-month-old security operation.

A top U.S. military official said American forces were taking advantage of the arrival of the final brigade of 30,000 additional U.S. troops to open concerted attacks.

"We are going into the areas that have been sanctuaries of al-Qaida and other extremists to take them on and weed them out, to help get the areas clear and to really take on al-Qaida," the senior official said on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak about the operation. "Those are areas in the belts around Baghdad, some parts in Anbar province and specifically Diyala province."

Al-Qaida has proven to be an extremely agile foe for U.S. and Iraqi forces, as shown by its ability to transfer major operations to Baqouba from Anbar province, the sprawling desert region in western Iraq. There is no guarantee that driving the organization out of current sanctuaries would prevent it from migrating to other regions to continue the fight.

The death toll in sectarian violence Monday skyrocketed after a brief period of relative peace. At least 111 people were killed or found dead nationwide, with 33 bodies of torture victims showing up in Baghdad alone.

Well to the south, Iraqi officials reported as many as 36 people were killed in fierce overnight fighting that began as British and Iraqi forces conducted house-to-house searches in Amarah, a stronghold of the Shiite Mahdi Army militia.

The U.S. military issued a statement that said at least 20 people were killed in clashes with coalition forces. A spokeswoman for Britain's Ministry of Defense said British soldiers played a supporting role to Iraqi security forces during the raid and fighting in Amarah. She spoke on condition of anonymity, which is ministry policy.

The operations on Baghdad's flanks were opened by the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division, which has taken over dangerous al-Qaida-infested regions to the south. The division began its drive into the Salman Pak and Arab Jabour districts on the city's southeastern fringe over the weekend.

At the time, ground forces commander Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno said U.S. troops were heading into those areas in force for the first time in three years.

The military said in a statement Monday that fighter jets dropped "four precision-guided bombs" in support of 1,200 U.S. soldiers from the 3rd Infantry as they started moving on al-Qaida targets.

Military officials said Multi-National Division-North forces likewise were increasing pressure on al-Qaida sanctuaries northeast of the capital in the verdant orange and palm groves of Diyala, now one of the most fiercely contested regions in Iraq.

The province is a tangle of Shiite and Sunni villages that has played into the hands of al-Qaida and allied militants who have melted into the tense region and sought to inflame existing sectarian troubles.

Al-Qaida has conducted public executions in the Baqouba main square and otherwise sought to enforce an extreme Taliban-style Islamic code. The terror organization's actions in the province have caused some Sunni militants, al-Qaida's natural allies, to turn their guns on the group with American assistance and blessing. Some militant Shiites are likewise joining government forces in a bid to oust the foreign fighters and Muslim extremists.

Multi-National Division-Baghdad, which has run the security operation in the capital since it began on Feb. 14, has increased pressure on districts to the northwest of the city to cut supply and reinforcement lines from Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province, to the Baqouba region.

"We're focusing up in the northwest to apply force in an area that's been important to al-Qaida and its associates as they move between Ramadi and Baqouba. That work, together with the developing efforts to provide local security through the (Sunni) tribes in Abu Ghraib and Amariyah, is putting pressure on al-Qaida," said Lt. Col. Scott Bleichwehl, division spokesman.

Some Sunni tribes, which had fought with or offered sanctuary to al- Qaida in Anbar province, have risen up against the group and are now receiving arms and training from U.S. forces. American military officials are trying to spread that success to al-Qaida areas now under attack.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, told visiting Defense Secretary Robert Gates last week that the United States should stop arming Sunnis who may have been part of the insurgency, according to officials in his office. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to release the information. Al-Maliki repeated that position in a television interview in Baghdad on Monday. . . .

Read the entire story here. Just as a side note, while one cannot blame the AP author for speculating that driving al Qaeda out of Diyala will mean they just turn up somewhere else, it also shows that they lack a bit in the hold on reality department. Al Qaeda will never be able to take root and create the kind of destruction it has to this point without having support or acuquiesence of the local populace. The reason that al Qaeda has headed in large numbers to Diyala is because that support is no longer avaialbe to them in much of Baghdad and Anbar, but it was present in parts of Diyala. This is not whack-a-mole. It is much more akin to methodically cornering an animal, taking away their freedom of movement piece by piece. The available dens for al Qaeda are drying up save for the last - the one where you meet Allah and inquire whether all that stuff about 72 nubile virgins is real or not.

Read More...

Summary only...

News From The Surge - As It Begins In Earnest

Now with all five combat brigades on the ground, General Petraues tells us that the surge will begin in earnest, moving into al Qaeda positions in Diyala and in the belts surrounding Baghdad - the areas that were either long term al Qaeda strongholds or areas that al Qaeda has retreated to escape the offensives in Baghdad and and Anbar.

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said Saturday that a troop surge in Iraq is only starting to have its full impact and that it is too soon to tell whether conditions will be ripe by September for decisions on US force levels.

The US commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, said that the latest troop reinforcements to arrive in theatre had enabled the military to begin major operations against Al-Qaeda rear-bases outside the capital.

"While I indicated yesterday that I think we'll see some trends and be able to point in some directions by September, the full impact of the surge is really just beginning to be felt," Gates said.

. . . Petraeus and US ambassador Ryan Crocker are supposed to report to a sceptical Congress in September on whether the surge is working or whether an alternative strategy is needed.

Gates was to meet Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki later to press for more rapid progress by his Shiite-led government in reaching out to the disenchanted Sunni former elite.

He is the third senior US official to deliver the same message over the past week, following Deputy Defence Secretary John Negroponte, the former US ambassador, and Admiral William Fallon, commander of US forces in the Middle East.

"We are pressing hard on those (reconcilation benchmarks)," said the US ambassador, who joined Gates and Petraeus at a news conference.

"The Iraqi government has been pushing itself. The progress has been frustratingly slow.

"We will see where we are by September. We will report at that time honestly as to what has been achieved and what hasn't," said Crocker.

Gates, who visited troops at a joint security post in Baghdad, said there had been successes in reducing violence in Anbar province west of the capital, although security had deteriorated in Diyala province to its north.

"In terms of the security situation, as I say we've got two months, three months to go. There are some positive trends, there are some negative trends," he said.

Petraeus said it was possible to make progress over the next few months.

"And then we'll see how long we'll sustain the surge, and how long we can sustain the surge, because those considerations enter into it as well."

. . . US troops levels in Iraq swelled to 155,000 over the past week as the last of five additional combat brigades deployed, US commanders said.

Petraeus said "fairly large coordinated offensive operations" had been launched against Al-Qaeda in areas outside Baghdad in the previous 24 hours.

"We have been doing what we might be calling shaping operations in a lot of these areas, doing intelligence gathering, putting in some special operators, going in but then coming out," he said.

"And now for the first time are we going to some key areas in the belt from which Al-Qaeda has sallied forth with car bombs and additional fighters and so forth."

Read the entire story here.

The military is reporting on the results of several raids tied to the new offensive.

Iraqi and coalition forces captured one terrorist leader and killed 16 suspected terrorists today. Ten more insurgents died in fighting yesterday.

Coalition forces in Baghdad captured five suspected terrorists, including an alleged al Qaeda in Iraq emir whose organization includes a deadly car-bomb cell in the city, during two raids today. At one targeted location, coalition forces destroyed two vehicles used to transport explosives and personnel for the terrorist network.

An operation in Mosul killed one terrorist. Outside the targeted building, a man identified as Izz al-Din, also known as Abu Ahmad, drew a weapon on the approaching ground forces. Coalition forces engaged and killed him. One suspected terrorist was detained on scene for his involvement with Abu Ahmad.

Abu Ahmad was the head of five terrorist cells in Mosul and was responsible for directing attacks against Iraqi and coalition forces, U.S. officials said.

Yesterday, Multinational Division Baghdad troops killed 10 insurgents who had launched a series of roadside-bomb and small-arms-fire ambushes in the West Rashid district of southern Baghdad.

. . . Meanwhile, a number of raids have taken place involving the discovery and seizure of enemy munitions. In one raid yesterday, nine individuals were detained on suspicion of running a bomb-making cell in the east Doura neighborhood of Baghdad’s Rashid district.

. . . In other news, troops seized several caches on June 13. Baghdad troops teamed up with a platoon of Iraqi national police to conduct a raid in the eastern Sadr City district.

The troops discovered three complete 60 mm mortar systems, complete 82 mm and 120 mm mortar systems, four 120 mm mortar rounds, 32 60 mm mortar rounds, three 107 mm rockets, a rifle scope, two AK-47 rifles, two sets of body armor, and a variety of weapon manuals.

An air and ground assault took place on two houses in Salman Pak on June 13. The raids yielded two 107 mm rockets, homemade explosives, two AK-47 assault rifles, a bolt-action rifle, several propane tanks, copper wire, ammunition, magazines, and several assault vests.

In another raid, Iraqi troops and Baghdad soldiers raided a weapons cache in the Yarmouk neighborhood. The cache contained 113 landmines, 63 grenades, three rockets, three mortars, two gas masks, five washing machine timers, more than 2,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, and seven boxes of various electronics and other assorted explosives.

It is the largest weapons cache discovery by U.S. or Iraqi forces to date in the Yarmouk area, U.S. officials said.

Read the entire story here.

The increased operational tempo and chasing the rats down their holes is inevitably going to lead to more U.S. casualties.

The fight for security in Baghdad is likely to “get harder over the coming months as we engage an increasingly desperate enemy,” the deputy secretary of state said in Baghdad today.

John D. Negroponte, who served as U.S. ambassador to Iraq from 2004 until assuming his current post in February, spoke with reporters after two days of meetings in Iraq with senior U.S. and Iraqi leaders.

All recognize that as the Baghdad security plan reaches full stride with the last of the surge troops arriving this month, difficult days are likely to remain ahead, he said.

Read the entire story here. For most of us, this is the unfortunate cost of succeeding in any military conflict. For Harry Reid, it is twisted into a sign of American failure.

On a far more important note then Senator Reid, here is a fascinating briefing on Mental Health in the military:

Read More...

Summary only...

Military's Quarterly Report on Iraq

You can find the U.S. Military’s Quarterly Report to Congress on Iraq here. The report covers the first two and a half months of the surge through the end of April, 2007. The surge is having an effect. Some highlights:

Sectarian murders peaked in December 06 with over, 1,100 sectarian incidents resulting in 1,600 sectarian murders. In April, the number of sectarian incidents was significantly down to just over 400 incidents with just over 600 sectarian murders.

Weapons caches found in Iraq numbered just 100 in July 2006. In April 2007, they numbered just shy of 700.

One of the most important figures – cooperation by the locals – can be roughly gauged from the number of tips being fed to coalition forces. Tips increased from a low of 4000 in June, 2006 to over 12,000 during April, 2007.

The coalition is having a lot more success as regards car bombs (VBIED). Car bombs found and cleared comprised roughly 69% of all VBIED incidents.

Al Qaeda in Iraq is the single greatest cause of violence in Iraq today.

Overall, violence is the same this quarter as last. The reasons are al Qaeda has moved into belts surrounding Baghdad and into Diyala Province to escape the surge and the Sunni uprising in Anbar. Al Qaeda is using suicide attacks and suicide car bombs against soft targets in these areas to keep the level of violence high.

The final elements of the surge are just now in place and it will be several months before any judgment can be made on the likelihood of success.

This quarterly report makes no mention of any area of Iraq being close to civil war

EXCERPTS From the Report:

Executive Summary

The strategic goal of the United States in Iraq remains a united Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. This report measures progress toward— and setbacks from—achieving this goal during this reporting period. Although the objectives have not changed, the strategy and tactics for achieving them have been modified and will continue to adapt to an evolving situation. The United States and its Coalition partners remain committed to help the Iraqi people assume full responsibility for their country.

. . . Sectarian killings have declined, especially in Baghdad; vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) found and cleared comprised roughly 69% of all VBIED incidents; and national confidence in the Government of Iraq’s (GoI) ability to improve the security environment reached its highest level (63%) in twelve months. In another somewhat encouraging development, Sunni tribal resistance to al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) along the Euphrates River Valley has been growing and—combined with a robust Coalition presence in Fallujah and Ramadi and increased effectiveness of Iraqi forces—is hindering AQI operations. However, local Sunni cooperation with and support to Coalition forces in Anbar Province is not uniform. As a result of this tribal resistance, violence in Anbar decreased markedly during the reporting period.

However, terrorist attacks increased in other areas as AQI and other groups attempted to spread sectarian conflict. As for the status of Iraqi security forces, the United States, its Coalition partners and the Iraqi Government continued to expand the size and capability of the Iraqi forces to meet emerging requirements. As of May 14, 2007, approximately 346,500 Iraqi personnel received training and equipment. Given the persistence of the violence by insurgents, terrorists and militias, the Iraqi forces will require continued training, development and equipping to be able to progressively assume missions from Coalition forces. Some of the main areas being addressed to increase the Iraqi forces’ capabilities include reform of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces, development of Ministry of Defense (MoD) and MoI logistics and administrative capabilities, development of combat enablers for the military forces and development of junior leaders.

On the political front, the United States and its Coalition partners are working with the GoI to safeguard gains and to develop strong institutions that impartially serve all Iraqis. Key legislative or reconciliation actions—such as the Hydrocarbon Law, de-Ba'athification reform, and Article 140 (Kirkuk)—were not completed during this reporting period, although progress was made. Encouraging efforts include the selection of the High Electoral Commission and the continuation of work on constitutional reform. During this period, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were doubled to enhance local and provincial administrative capacity. Reconciliation remains a serious unfulfilled objective.

While significant challenges remain, several positive economic developments emerged. The most significant was the launch in Egypt on May 3, 2007 of the International Compact with Iraq to help Iraq gain assistance and debt relief contingent on political and economic reforms. Additionally, the Central Bank of Iraq made progress in reducing price inflation, and GoI statistics show a slight improvement in employment. The International Monetary Fund found satisfactory Iraqi performance to date under the Standby Arrangement. However, oil production, the principal economic driver in Iraq, is not growing and remained at about the same levels as during this period in 2006 due to poor infrastructure and inadequate security.

Additional efforts will be needed to build the capacity of Iraqi ministries and provinces to execute their capital investment budgets, particularly for the oil sector, which is the key to supporting economic development. The Department of Defense continued to help the GoI revitalize certain state-owned enterprises to increase employment and make them more attractive for privatization.

Overall, it is too early to assess the impact of the new approach. For the period covered by this report, the additional forces to support the new approach were not fully in place, and those that were had only a limited time to conduct operations. In addition, new initiatives such as enhanced PRTs and focused efforts to improve GoI budget execution and rule of law remain in their initial stages. On the political front, reconciliation is a top priority. Economically, further provision of goods and services by the GoI that benefit the Iraqi population is required. Progress will depend on Iraqi follow-through on their commitments made as part of the new approach; the actions of insurgents, militia and terrorists to disrupt reconciliation will be a key challenge to the Iraqi government’s ability to fulfill its commitments. . .


Iranian Influence

Various Shi’a and Kurdish politicians maintain longstanding relationships with Iranian officials and state organizations, and Iran maintains longstanding economic and religious ties to Iraq. The Iranians likely seek a Shi’a dominated Iraqi government that is deferential to and supportive of Iranian interests.

The Iranian regime’s primary tool for exercising clandestine influence in Iraq is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Qods Force (QF), which provides arms, intelligence, funds, training, and propaganda support to Iraqi Shi’a militants targeting and killing Coalition and Iraqi forces, as well as Iraqi civilians. The QF seeks to increase long-term Iranian strategic influence in Iraq and the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Among the weapons it provides to Iraqi militants are improvised explosive devices (IEDs), advanced IED technologies (including explosively formed projectiles (EFPs)), and rockets and mortars used for indirect fire attacks. U.S. forces in Iraq are acting to disrupt any network—regardless of nationality—that provides weapons to Iraqi militants and insurgents. These actions are consistent with the mandate granted to the MNF-I by both the UN Security Council and the GoI to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of Iraq’s security and stability, as well as defense. The USG has urged Iran to play a more constructive role in Iraq.

Syrian Influence

Syria seeks to maintain ties with the New Ba’ath Party in Iraq and to hasten the withdrawal of Coalition forces from the region. Syria has emerged as an important organizational and coordination hub for elements of the former Iraqi regime, allowing these groups to engage in activities hostile to our efforts from within Syrian borders. Although Damascus has made some recent improvements in combating cross-border terrorist movements by arresting insurgents it considers a threat to its own internal security, terrorists and foreign fighters continue to find sanctuary, border transit opportunities, and logistical support in Syria.

Tensions on the Border with Turkey

Turkey’s primary concerns regarding Iraq continue to be terrorism executed by the Kurdistan Peoples Congress (KGK, formerly PKK) and the final status of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Public disagreements between Turkish and Kurdish leaders have strained relations between Turkey and Iraq and continued KGK terrorism in Turkey (along with heightened civil-military tensions in Turkey as it approaches national elections in July) are likely to increase those strains. The U.S. Special Envoy for Countering the KGK continues to engage Turkish and Iraqi counterparts to increase cooperation against the terrorist threat from the KGK. Progress has been made toward a tripartite agreement on closing down Makhmour refugee camp, which will eliminate a potential haven for KGK propaganda and influence on young Turkish Kurds.

Tensions in Kirkuk have nevertheless increased in recent months. According to Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, a referendum must be held on the final status of Kirkuk by the end of 2007. Turkoman and Arab communities’ concern over increased Kurdish control of Kirkuk’s governing institutions has led Turkey to speak out on behalf of the Turkoman community in protest of the perceived Kurdish goal of independence. . .



Security Environment

. . . Much of the violence is attributable to sectarian friction, and each faction is driven by its own political and economic power relationships. Illegally armed groups are engaged in a cycle of sectarian and politically motivated violence, using tactics that include indiscriminate bombing, murder, executions, and indirect fire to intimidate and to provoke sectarian conflict. The United States is supporting Iraqi efforts to reduce sectarian violence in Baghdad, regain control over the capital, and defeat al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its supporters, ensuring that they find no safe haven in Iraq.

. . . In support of political efforts, Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (FAQ) was launched on February 14, 2007 as the main security component of the New Way Forward. FAQ is intended to provide population security, primarily in Baghdad, to contain the sectarian violence and give Iraqis an opportunity to pursue political reconciliation and to implement government reforms. FAQ involves an increase of five U.S. Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and support forces; four of the five BCTs are now in place. The remaining BCT will be in place in June.

. . . Nonetheless, Iraqi units are generally performing up to expectations. Although the initial battalions had mixed results in deploying at desired manning levels, units deployed later had sufficient soldiers and officers to meet operational requirements, and some Iraqi commanders showed an ability to plan, command, and control relatively
sophisticated joint and/or combined operations.


. . . Prime Minister Maliki has verbally committed to a militia demobilization, disarmament, and re-integration (DDR) program. A 12 May amnesty workshop named an executive director of the program. In early April, Prime Minister Maliki approved the DDR committee structure and appointed an Executive Director for the committee. As of
this report, committee members have yet to be appointed and work has not begun on drafting a DDR plan. The 2007 Iraqi budget includes US$150 million to institute this program. Militia will remain a problem as long as the public lacks confidence in the ability of the Iraqi Army and Police to adequately perform the protective role that militia claim in many communities. Establishing an effective DDR program will probably require technical assistance from the international community as well as broad support from within Iraq. In addition, the extent of the Iraqi public’s commitment to such a program is unclear. In Baghdad, a majority of residents report that militias act in the best interest of the Iraqi people. On a positive note, only 20% of respondents held this view nationwide.

Overall Assessment of the Security Environment

The overall level of violence in Iraq this quarter remained similar to the previous reporting period but shifted location. Insurgents and extremists are unable to operate as freely in Baghdad because of FAQ and in Anbar Province because of growing tribal opposition to AQI. Accordingly, many insurgents and extremists have moved operations to Diyala, Ninewa, and the outlying areas of Baghdad Province. Outside Baghdad and Anbar, reductions in Coalition force presence and reliance upon local Iraqi security forces have resulted in a tenuous security situation. Sectarian violence and insurgent attacks still involve a very small portion of the population, but public perceptions of violence have adversely affected reconciliation and contribute to population migration. Early indications are that sectarian killings have declined (albeit possibly temporarily) in Baghdad and that some Sunni tribes in Anbar Province will no longer tolerate AQI operations. Continued operations should build upon these encouraging signs.

The conflict in Iraq remains complex and requires that the GoI and the Coalition continue to undercut the root causes throughout the country. FAQ demonstrates that some positive changes in the dynamics that perpetuate violence may be possible, but more time, and careful analysis will be required before conclusions about the effectiveness of this effort can be reached. Some preliminary results include a significant increase in the number of caches cleared (reaching a 12-month high in April) and a significant reduction in sectarian murders and executions nationwide.


Assessment of the Security Environment—

Baghdad

Baghdad is the center of gravity in the struggle for political and economic influence in Iraq for irreconcilable violent groups. Although it is still too early to assess whether a sustainable trend is emerging, attacks in Baghdad declined as Coalition and Iraqi force presence expanded while Sunni insurgent groups and Shi’a militants departed or refrained from operations. Despite the departure of large numbers of JAM fighters from Baghdad, JAM has continued to act as a de-facto government in Sadr City.

Although sectarian-motivated Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence has declined in Baghdad, violence against Coalition and Iraqi security forces remained consistent with previous levels. Despite heightened security measures and increased ISF proficiency at reducing civilian casualties from sectarian murders and executions, AQI maintained the ability to conduct infrequent, high-profile, mass-casualty attacks in Baghdad.

Assessment of the Security Environment—

Western Iraq

AQI remains the primary threat to the security environment in Anbar Province, where it continues to target local ISF through use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), suicide attacks, assassinations, and hit-and-run attacks to subvert and undermine governmental institutions. There are some early signs that are encouraging as Sunni tribal resistance to AQI along the Euphrates River Valley has grown, and combined with a robust ISF and Coalition presence in Fallujah and Ramadi, has begun to hinder AQI operations. However, local Sunni cooperation with and support to Coalition forces in Anbar Province is not uniform. Moreover, the Iraqi public in Western Iraq is increasingly willing to provide intelligence and report weapons caches. As part of the increase in force levels, 4,000 additional Marines are currently deploying into Anbar Province.

These additional Marines, in conjunction with an expansion of the ISF, and aided by increasing tribal resistance to AQI, are pushing AQI out of many of the population centers, facilitating stability in large parts of the province. Although tribal resistance to AQI is a positive development in Anbar, insurgent groups continue to attack Coalition and ISF targets in other areas in western Iraq, excluding Anbar. The recent success of tribal engagement in Anbar Province is primarily driven by a concerted campaign of widespread contact with the Anbar tribes ranging from the
Syrian border to Baghdad. The Sahawa al- Iraqi (SAI), formerly known as Sahawa al- Anbar, an anti-AQI tribal movement led by 41-year-old Sheikh Abdul Sattar Bezea Fitikhan al-Rishawi, claims 24 tribes as organizational members. Primarily Ramadicentric, SAI is representative of the capabilities of tribal alliances to assist the Coalition in fighting AQI and other resistance elements. Though notable for its contributions to fighting AQI, the SAI is not alone in tribal efforts to eradicate AQI. Large and influential tribes, such as the Albu Mahal, Albu Nimr, and Albu Issa, have also actively opposed AQI.

Euphrates River Valley has grown, and combined with a robust ISF and Coalition presence in Fallujah and Ramadi, has begun to hinder AQI operations. However, local Sunni cooperation with and support to Coalition forces in Anbar Province is not uniform. Moreover, the Iraqi public in Western Iraq is increasingly willing to provide intelligence and report weapons caches. As part of the increase in force levels, 4,000 additional Marines are currently deploying into Anbar Province. These additional Marines, in conjunction with an expansion of the ISF, and aided by increasing tribal resistance to AQI, are pushing AQI out of many of the population centers, facilitating stability in large parts of the province. Although tribal resistance to AQI is a positive development in Anbar, insurgent groups continue to attack Coalition and ISF targets in other areas in western Iraq, excluding Anbar.

The recent success of tribal engagement in Anbar Province is primarily driven by a concerted campaign of widespread contact with the Anbar tribes ranging from the Syrian border to Baghdad. The Sahawa al- Iraqi (SAI), formerly known as Sahawa al- Anbar, an anti-AQI tribal movement led by 41-year-old Sheikh Abdul Sattar Bezea
Fitikhan al-Rishawi, claims 24 tribes as organizational members. . . .

SAI is representative of the capabilities of tribal alliances to assist the Coalition in fighting AQI and other resistance elements. Though notable for its contributions to fighting AQI, the SAI is not alone in tribal efforts to eradicate AQI.

Large and influential tribes, such as the Albu Mahal, Albu Nimr, and Albu Issa, have also actively opposed AQI.

Assessment of the Security Environment—

Central/Northern Iraq

Outside of Baghdad, this reporting period saw increased inter-sectarian violence in Diyala, increased high-profile attacks in northern Iraq by AQI, and Coalition and Iraqi forces confronting the JAM—the Shi’a militia associated with the radical cleric Muktada-al Sadr—in Diwaniyah. Ongoing ethnic and sectarian violence in central and northern Iraq is a reflection of AQI and JAM elements competing for political control of Diyala Province—particularly as some of the Baghdad militia fighters moved to the province. On a positive note, there are initial signs that some tribes in Diyala are discussing ways of countering AQI. Coalition forces are using lessons learned in tribal engagement in Anbar to help reconciliation efforts in areas such as Abu Ghraib, Samara and Bayji.

In Ninewa Province, Mosul is AQI’s northern strategic base and serves as a way-station for foreign fighters entering from Syria. There, insurgent and terrorist groups have increased the frequency and intensity of attacks on the local police. AQI’s efforts to reignite sectarian violence in Tal’Afar through high-profile attacks against civilians reflects its desire to undermine stability along sectarian fault lines and deepen the conflict in Iraq. Coalition forces deployed to Baqubah in mid-March and local ISF units have been unable to diminish rising sectarian violence contributingto the volatile security situation.

AQI has shifted some of its focus to the north. This is due in part to expanded Coalition and Iraqi operations in Baghdad and the rise of ethnic tensions in Kirkuk. These tensions may mount as property is reallocated to Kurds displaced under the previous regime’s Arabization programs and as the prospect of a census and referendum on Kirkuk’s status looms. Kurdish and Sunni Arab concerns about fair distribution of hydrocarbon revenues also could exacerbate tensions.

Assessment of the Security Environment—

Kurdish Region

The overall security situation is stable in Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah, and several foreign countries are establishing consulates and pursuing oil and energy business interests in the Kurdish region. However, the attack on May 9 against the Kurdish Ministry of Interior in Irbil demonstrates that AQI maintains its ability to strike in the Kurdish region. Violence occurs mostly in outlying areas near the border with Iran.

Traditional conflicts with Ansar al-Sunnah (AS) have ebbed and flowed in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) region since the mid- 1990’s. The newly formed Brigades of Kurdistan announced their intent to attack the Kurdish government but the capabilities of the group is unknown. While AQI’s increased presence in northern Iraq is of growing concern, AQI largely conducts its anti-Kurdish operations in Kirkuk and Mosul, rarely venturing to more remote areas in the region in large part due to the presence of Kurdish security forces.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has provided relatively good governance over the three Kurdish provinces. The existence of the Kongra Gel (KGK) and the potential for border skirmishes with Turkey or Iran, and in the case of the KGK, possible cross-border operations by the Turkish Army, are issues that could increase tensions in the Kurdish region.

Assessment of the Security Environment—

Southern Iraq

The security situation in southern Iraq is characterized by competition between various Shi’a militia, factions, tribes and organized criminals aligned with various parties positioning themselves for greater influence over local authorities and resources. Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (formerly SCIRI) (SIIC) maintains a strong political presence in the south. Increased political competition between SIIC and the Office of Martyr Sadr (OMS), the political arm of JAM, has resulted in clashes between their respective armed wings, the Badr Organization and JAM. Some JAM members relocated to the south in response to FAQ in Baghdad, further empowering JAM in confrontations with both Badr and provincial authorities. In Basrah Province, the OMS and the governing Fadilah Party vie for dominance over local economic activity, adding to the intra-Shi’a violence. This intra- Shi’a violence has contributed to a significant increase in attacks against Coalition forces in Basrah and an observed greater hostility towards Coalition presence, as well as highlighted the failure of the Iraqi police to challenge Shi’a militants in southern Iraq. In Diwaniyah, however, a reported increase in JAM presence and aggression prompted local officials to request military action to lessen JAM’s influence and local control.

Relatively little AQI activity has been observed in southern Iraq.


Overall Attack Trends and Violence

For this report, the term “attacks” refers to specific incidents reported in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Significant Activities Database. It includes known attacks on Coalition forces, Iraqi forces, the civilian population and infrastructure. Attacks typically involve improvised explosive devices; small arms, including sniper fire; and indirect fires. Not all civilian casualties are observed by or reported to Coalition forces; as a result, these data only provide a partial picture of the violence experienced by Iraqis.

The aggregate level of violence in Iraq remained relatively unchanged during this reporting period. Violence has decreased in the Baghdad security districts and Anbar, but has increased in most provinces, particularly in the outlying areas of Baghdad Province and Diyala and Ninewa Provinces. Since January 2007, Coalition reported murders in Baghdad proper have decreased by 51% as militia activity was disrupted by security operations. Throughout Iraq, the total number of attacks on Coalition forces, the ISF, and Iraqi civilians increased by 2% in the February through May reporting period compared with the previous quarter.

High-profile attacks, usually conducted by AQI, are now causing more casualties in Baghdad than do murders by militia, criminals, or other armed groups. Spectacular attacks on historical and significant infrastructure (such as Baghdad bridges and the Parliament building) seek to discredit FAQ, the Coalition presence, and the GoI, rather than create casualties. In Anbar province, anti-AQI sentiment is widespread, with growing tribal influence as the primary driver of decreasing violence levels. The total number of attacks in Anbar has dropped 34% since December 2006, with Ramadi—where attacks are at a two-year low—accounting for the largest decline in violence levels.

Attacks in Anbar have dropped from 35 per day in the previous reporting period to just under 26, dipping below average daily attacks in Salah ad Din Province.

Less encouraging, the number of suicide attacks across Iraq increased from 26 in January to 58 in March and remained constant at 58 in April. During the reporting period, the average number of improvised explosive devices found and cleared increased 15% from the previous quarter, and the average number of vehicleborne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) found and cleared rose by 69%. These gains are likely due to increased civilian cooperation and interdiction of the networks conducting these attacks.

The majority of overall attacks continue to occur against Coalition forces, while the ISF and civilians continue to suffer the majority of casualties. Consistent with previous reporting periods, most attacks occurred in Baghdad, Anbar, Salah ad Din, and Diyala provinces. Explosively formed projectile attacks were at an all-time high in April.


Public Perceptions of Security

Public perception of security is shaped by the confidence the people have in the government and its security forces, as well as the perception they have of neighborhood safety. On security, Iraqis continue to feel more positive at the local level than they do at the national level. The perceptions of safety inside and outside neighborhoods correlate with their perception of local and national tensions. Within Baghdad, the Joint Security Stations contribute to this improvement by providing local tip hotlines, and local security force responsiveness to these calls provide tangible, visible proof that the security forces are responsible to and for the people. These actions may contribute to the continued support for the dissolution of militias, not only in Baghdad, but nationwide as well. . . .

Read More...

Summary only...

Who & Why - A Second Bombing At The Samarra Mosque

The downward spiral of sectarian violence in Iraq began in February 2006 with an al Qaeda in Iraq bombing of the Samarra Mosque, one of the holiest of Shiite shrines. It had long been the stated goal of al Qaeda to fan the flames of civil war, and with that bombing, they came close to succeeding. Repair work on the Mosque was planned, but never started.

In the aftermath of the February 2006 bombing, and as part of the Iraqi security plan, the mission to guard the Mosque was charged to an Iraqi Police Battalion. Nonetheless, this morning, two explosions at the base of the mosque brought down two of the minarets still standing from the original blast. Who did this and why did they do it are two questions with several possible answers. This from the Washington Post:

Early morning blasts Wednesday destroyed two minarets at the same Shiite shrine in Samarra where an attack last year demolished the mosque's gilded dome and plunged the country into a wave of deadly sectarian violence.

The 9 a.m. explosions at the revered Askariya shrine in Samarra, about 65 miles north of Baghdad, is the sort of event that could spark a spiral of retaliatory bloodshed. . . .

The Feb. 22, 2006 attack on the shrine -- often referred to as the Golden Mosque because of its brilliant golden dome -- was a seminal moment in the four-year Iraq war, sparking a vicious cycle of bloodshed that has never fully stopped. In the 16 months since, thousands of Iraqis -- and perhaps tens of thousands -- have been killed in Sunni-Shiite fighting.

. . . Fearing a backlash from the latest attack, the Iraqi government imposed an indefinite curfew across Baghdad starting 3 p.m. Wednesday. There were no immediate reports of retaliatory violence, and no reports that anyone was injured in the attack at the shrine.

"This is a terrorist attack that is aimed at inciting sectarian crisis, and it is the work of a foreign agenda whose aim is to stoke sectarian strife, instability and a collapse of the political process," said Hussein Al Musawi, spokesman for the Shiite Political Council, an umbrella group of Shiite political parties.

"There is an obvious failure on the part of the Iraqi security forces, and the multinationals, to guard these shrines and to deal the terrorists groups a blow, and to strike with an iron fist against the terrorists."

. . . In response to Wednesday's attack, the entire Iraqi security force responsible for guarding the mosque, the 3rd Battalion of the Salahaddin Province police, was detained for investigation, Iraqi law enforcement officials said. The collapse of the two minarets appeared to have been caused by explosive charges placed at their bases.

. . . After Wednesday's explosions, Iraqi security forces patrolled the city, firing in the air and announcing the curfew from loudspeakers mounted on jeeps. In Baghdad and elsewhere, Shiite mosques broadcast calls for demonstrations.

In a sign of the sectarian tensions quickly provoked by the incident, members of the Iraqi security forces, which are dominated by Shiites, yelled threats at Samarra residents, blaming them for the destruction of the mosque and threatening revenge. Some citizens, meanwhile, hurled remarks back, asking how anyone could destroy the minarets when the entire religious complex was being so carefully guarded by Iraqi security forces.

The mosque, one of the four most revered in Iraq, has been heavily guarded by Iraqi troops ever since the destruction of its gilded dome in the 2006 attack.

Radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr called for peaceful demonstrations and reconciliation within Iraq's warring factions to mark the minarets' destruction. In a written statement, Sadr said Sunnis and Shiites should unite and declared that no Sunni Arab could have been responsible for the attack on the Shiite shrine.

He claimed that U.S. occupation forces bore responsibility for the blasts, though the precise nature of that alleged responsibility was not made clear.

"We declare a three-day mourning period . . . and shout Allahu Akbar (God is greater) from Sunni and Shiite mosques," Sadr said in the statement.

U.S. military spokesman Lt. Col. Christopher Garver said that U.S. forces were assisting the Iraqi government in responding to the attack and had provided a team to help assess the damage. Although there were U.S. troops in the region, he said, "The security for the shrine itself is an Iraqi responsibility." . . .

Read the entire storyhere. There are two possible motivations for this bombing.

The first is to reignite sectarian violence and to undo the significant gains made by the surge. Although it is clear that al Qaeda in Iraq carried out the initial attack, it is far less clear who carried out this second attack. Al Qaeda in Iraq, Moqtada al Sadr, Iran and Congressional Democrats all have a vested interest in seeing the surge fail, and it would not be beyond at least the first three to have conducted this bombing. Given that the battalion guarding the mosque is made up of Shiites, it seems likely either Sadr's militia or an Iranian proxy carried out this attack.

The second possible motivation is a false flag operation by Sadr to use the bombing as a means of establishing his bona fides as a national political figure looking out for the interests of Sunni and Shia alike. Given his quick response to the bombing and his calls for peace, this is plausible. If so, it would mark Sadr as having far more intelligence and nuance then I believe he actually possesses. That, or this could have been planned on his behalf for that purpose by his Iranian handlers if, as seems likely, Sadr is a tool of the Khomeinists at this point.

In either event, it just does not seem likely that, in the absence of vociferous rhetoric played out across Iraqi air waves, that this second attack against the still unrepaired Samarra mosque will draw anywhere near the same ire of the nation as was caused by the first attack. It bears watching carefully who attempts to capitalize on this bombing, how they do it and to what end. That may go a long way to telling us who are the true culprits.

Read More...

Summary only...

Al Jazeera - Radical Islam's Broadcast Mouthpiece

It would seem the problems of agenda journalism infest MSM the world over. In the Middle East the al Jazeera network regualarly gives friendly coverage to the point of acting as "official spokesman and activist for fundamentalist groups." That is the charge in a column in the London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat by Egyptian columnist Diana Muqallid. She makes her charges in light of al Jazeera's coverage of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and al Jazeera's most recent coverage of the conflict between Lebanon and Fath al Islam, the Syrian and al Qaeda linked group currently fighting the Lebanese army inside Lebanon's Nahr al Bared Palestinian Refugee camp:

. . . On the fourth day of the battles around the Nahr Al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon, the Al-Jazeera network opened its evening news with a preface, in which the announcer said that the story that was about to be broadcast included exclusive photos from inside the Palestinian refugee camp showing the scope of the killing and the extent of the 'human suffering' of the camp residents.

The footage that followed showed Fath Al-Islam fighters in their positions, firing at targets that clearly belonged to the Lebanese army. The footage showed not one sight reflecting the suffering of the Palestinian residents; the focus was on the armed fighters, who repeated over and over... statements such as 'satanic tyrants' and 'infidels,' as they exchanged information on the positions of their fighting 'brothers.'

Yet again, Al-Jazeera has not hesitated to play the role it played in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine - that of official spokesman and activist for fundamentalist groups. It seems obvious that the Fath Al-Islam fighters were dealing with a 'friendly' camera, not with a journalistic camera. [This friendly
coverage of Fath Al-Islam] quickly created a connection between [Fath Al-Islam] - which accuses [others] of heresy and regularly carries out massacres and indiscriminate killing, and whose members blow themselves up - and the [Al-Jazeera] channel, which from its outset has ignited Islamic populism and whose influence is growing...

[Al-Jazeera] did not mention the fact that [this] group had slaughtered [Lebanese] soldiers in their sleep. [But] the most important point is that the [special] news flashes and news headlines about the ongoing shelling [of the refugee camp] by the [Lebanese] army never referred to the ongoing entrenchment of the Fath Al-Islam fighters among the residents, and to their shelling of aid and rescue convoys.

Concealing or ignoring the suffering of the Palestinian residents would be a black stain on any [political] body or media outlet, whether it be Lebanese or Arab. But extolling the Fath Al-Islam murderers, and making efforts to associate them with civilians, is first and foremost a crime against the Palestinian residents [of the camp], even more than it is a crime against Lebanon." . . .

Read the entire story here.

Read More...

Summary only...

The Radical Islamic Quest for Nuclear Weapons

The Guardian today is breaking a story that MI-6 has shut down a British corporation involved in the purchase of black market weapons grade uranium for transfer to Iran and the Sudan - with suspected al Qaeda involvement:

A British company has been closed down after being caught in an apparent attempt to sell black-market weapons-grade uranium to Iran and Sudan, The Observer can reveal.

Anti-terrorist officers and MI6 are now investigating a wider British-based plot allegedly to supply Iran with material for use in a nuclear weapons programme. One person has already been charged with attempting to proliferate 'weapons of mass destruction'.

During the 20-month investigation, . . . a group of Britons was tracked as they obtained weapons-grade uranium from the black market in Russia. Investigators believe it was intended for export to Sudan and on to Iran.

A number of Britons, who are understood to have links with Islamic terrorists abroad, remain under surveillance. Investigators believe they have uncovered the first proof that al-Qaeda supporters have been actively engaged in developing an atomic capability. The British company, whose identity is known to The Observer but cannot be disclosed for legal reasons, has been wound up.

. . . British agents believe Russian black-market uranium was destined for Sudan, described as a 'trans-shipment' point. The alleged plot, however, was disrupted in early 2006, before the nuclear material reached its final destination.

Roger Berry, chairman of Parliament's Quadripartite Committee, which monitors arms exports, said: 'With the collapse of the Soviet Union there was always the question over not just uranium but where other WMD components were going and how this could be controlled. Real credit must go to the enforcement authorities that they have disrupted this. The really worrying aspect is that if one company is involved, are there others out there?'

Politically, the allegations hold potentially huge ramifications for diplomatic relations between the West and Tehran. Already, tensions are running high between Iran, the US and the European Union over the true extent of Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iran refuses to suspend its nuclear programme in the face of mounting pressure, arguing its intent is entirely peaceful and solely aimed at producing power for civilian use.

Investigators are understood to have evidence that Iran was to receive the uranium to help develop a nuclear weapons capability. 'They may argue that the material is for civilian use but it does seem an extremely odd way to procure uranium,' said Berry.

Alleged evidence of Sudan's role will concern British security services. The East African state has long been suspected of offering a haven for Islamist terrorists and has been accused of harbouring figures including Osama bin Laden who, during the mid-Nineties, set up a number of al-Qaeda training camps in the country.

Details of the plot arrive against a backdrop of increasing co-operation between Sudan and Iran on defence issues, although the level of involvement, if any, of the governments in Khartoum and Tehran in the alleged nuclear plot is unclear.

However, circumstantial evidence suggesting that elements within both countries might be colluding on military matters has been mounting in recent months. A Sudanese delegation visited Iran's uranium conversion facility in February, while the East African country reportedly recently signed a mutual defence co-operation pact with Iran, allowing Tehran to deploy ballistic missiles in Sudan.

Read the entire story here.

Read More...

Summary only...

Iraq - Target Practice on Iran's Proxy Rocket Teams, Strange Allies, & Briefing on Iraq

To start with, the Iranians are training and supplying Mahdi Army elements with rockets . . . and providing our Apache crews with target practice.




In the Amiriyah neighborhood of Baghdad, there is ongoing "red on red" fighting - Sunni insurgents fighting al Qaeda - that Iraq the Model discussed several days ago. Today, the Washington Post gives us a clearer picture of the fighting, including a Sunni insurgent's call for U.S. logistical help fighting al Qaeda:

The worst month of Lt. Col. Dale Kuehl's deployment in western Baghdad was finally drawing to a close. The insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq had unleashed bombings that killed 14 of his soldiers in May, a shocking escalation of violence for a battalion that had lost three soldiers in the previous six months while patrolling the Sunni enclave of Amiriyah. On top of that, the 41-year-old battalion commander was doubled up with a stomach flu when, late on May 29, he received a cellphone call that would change everything.

"We're going after al-Qaeda," a leading local imam said, Kuehl recalled. "What we want you to do is stay out of the way."

"Sheik, I can't do that. I can't just leave Amiriyah and let you go at it."

"Well, we're going to go."

The week that followed revolutionized Kuehl's approach to fighting the insurgency and serves as a vivid example of a risky, and expanding, new American strategy of looking beyond the Iraqi police and army for help in controlling violent neighborhoods. The American soldiers in Amiriyah have allied themselves with dozens of Sunni militiamen who call themselves the Baghdad Patriots -- a group that American soldiers believe includes insurgents who have attacked them in the past -- in an attempt to drive out al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Americans have granted these gunmen the power of arrest, allowed the Iraqi army to supply them with ammunition, and fought alongside them in chaotic street battles.

To many American soldiers in Amiriyah, this nascent allegiance stands out as an encouraging development after months of grinding struggle. They liken the fighters to the minutemen of the American Revolution, painting them as neighbors taking the initiative to protect their families in the vacuum left by a failing Iraqi security force. In their first week of collaboration, the Baghdad Patriots and the Americans killed roughly 10 suspected al-Qaeda in Iraq members and captured 15, according to Kuehl, who said those numbers rivaled totals for the previous six months combined. He is now working to fashion the group into the beginnings of an Amiriyah police force, since the mainly Shiite police force refuses to work in the area.

"This is a defining moment for us," said Kuehl, who commands the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, attached to the 1st Infantry Division.

But aligning Americans with fighters whose long-term agenda remains unclear -- with regard to either Americans or the Shiite-led government -- is also a strategy born of desperation. It contradicts repeated declarations by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki that no groups besides the Iraqi and American security forces are allowed to bear arms. And some American soldiers worry that standing up a Sunni militia could have dire consequences if the group turns on its U.S. partners.

"We have made a deal with the devil," said an intelligence officer in the battalion.

The U.S. effort to recruit indigenous forces to defend local communities has been taken furthest in Anbar province, where tribal leaders have encouraged thousands of their kinsmen to join the police. In the Abu Ghraib area, west of Baghdad, about 2,000 people unaffiliated with security forces are now working with Americans at village checkpoints and gun positions.

Kuehl said he recognizes the risks in dealing with an unofficial force but decided the intelligence that the gunmen provided on al-Qaeda in Iraq was too valuable to pass up.

"Hell, nothing else has worked in Amiriyah," he said.

It was about 2 a.m. on May 30 when Capt. Andy Wilbraham, a 33-year-old company commander, first heard military chatter on his tank radio about rumors that local gunmen would take on al-Qaeda. Later that morning, a noncommissioned officer turned to him with the news: "They're uprising."

"It was just a shock it happened so fast," Wilbraham said.

By noon, loudspeakers in mosques throughout Amiriyah were broadcasting a call to war: "It is time to stand up and fight" al-Qaeda. Groups of men, some in black ski masks carrying AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, descended on the area around the Maluki mosque, a suspected al-Qaeda in Iraq base of operations, and launched an attack. For the most part, Kuehl's soldiers stood back, trying to contain the violence and secure other mosques, and let the gunmen do their work. . .

"We need them and they need us," Kuehl said. "Al-Qaeda's stronger than them. We provide capabilities that they don't have. And the locals know who belongs and who doesn't. It doesn't matter how long we're here, I'll never know. And we'll never fit in."

The militiamen, who call themselves freedom fighters, are led by a 35-year-old former Iraqi army captain and used-car salesman who goes by Saif or Abu Abed. In an interview, he said he had devoted the past five months to collecting intelligence on al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters in Amiriyah, whose ranks have grown as they have fled to Baghdad and away from the new tribal policemen in Anbar province. He has said his own group numbers over 100 people, but American soldiers estimate it has closer to 40. At least six were killed and more than 10 wounded in the first week of collaboration with Americans.

. . . Ali Hatem Ali Suleiman, a leader of the Sunni Dulaimi tribe who works in Anbar and Baghdad, said many of the fighters in Amiriyah belong to the Islamic Army, which includes former officers from Saddam Hussein's military and is more secular than other insurgent groups. The fighters have been organized and encouraged by local imams.

"Let's be honest, the enemy now is not the Americans, for the time being," Suleiman said. "It's al-Qaeda and the [Shiite] militias. Those are our enemies." . . .

"Who are these guys really?" Salge remembered worrying. He told them to talk to the battalion commander.

Kuehl said later that he would probably supply weapons to the militiamen, but in limited amounts. The fighters have given the Americans identification, including fingerprints, addresses and retinal scans, so the soldiers believe they could track down anyone who betrayed them. "What I don't want them to do is wither on the vine," Kuehl said.

On Wednesday, a week after the fighting broke out, the Islamic Army issued a statement declaring a cease-fire with al-Qaeda in Iraq because the groups did not want to spill more Muslim blood or impede "the project of jihad." American soldiers played down the statement and suggested it did not reflect the sentiments of the men they are working with in Amiriyah. . .

Read the entire story here. A strange alliance indeed - but a very hopeful sign. Still, even if only temporary, it is al Qaeda that is by far the major problem, doing their best to ignite civil war. Stop al Qaeda and you are very far along to stabilizing Iraq. While I would never turn my back on these guys, I would also, at this point, give them all the logistical support they need to fight al Qaeda and to protect their neighborhoods from rouge Shia militia cells.

Sec. of Defense Gates announces the nomination for Admiral Mullins to Chairman of the Joint Chief Of Staff.




3d Bdr, 25th Inf Div. are in the Kirkuk area of the Iraq. This is a briefing on the situation in their area by the Cdr, Col Patrick Stackpole.

Read More...

Summary only...

Iraqi Insanity

There is the news of Coalition operations and successes (good). Then there is the MSM reporting on Iraq comprised of a list of friendly casualties and the successes of al Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian proxies (bad). Then there is the news coming out the senate confirmation hearings for the new "czar" for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, LTG Lute (insanity).

The only places to learn what is going on in Iraq is through the military sites and milblogs. None of the information being posted by the MSM, and in particular the Washington Post or the NYT, is by any means complete. To the contrary, the Washington Post and New York Times reporting is often so one sided it could be written by al Qaeda's propoganda arm. Lest you think me partisan, do please read on.

From the DoD, here is what went on in Iraq in the past 24 plus hours:

Coalition forces today captured 32 suspected terrorists during a series of raids that targeted al Qaeda operations in Baghdad and western Iraq, officials said.

Coalition forces in central Iraq today detained 16 suspected terrorists during operations that targeted al Qaeda in Iraq leaders.

-- In three coordinated raids southeast of Fallujah, coalition forces detained 11 suspected terrorists with al Qaeda ties. Officials believed two of them are responsible for recruiting and facilitating terrorist cells in the area.

-- Coalition forces also captured a suspected al Qaeda in Iraq terrorist leader during a raid on two buildings in Hit. The individual allegedly replaced another senior leader who’d recently fled the area. Coalition forces detained three more suspected terrorists at the scene for their connection to al Qaeda senior leadership.

-- In continuing operations to disrupt the car-bomb network, coalition forces detained one suspected terrorist in Baghdad.

"Our methodical, sustained operations are making it more difficult for al Qaeda to operate, and we'll continue to apply pressure to eliminate their attacks against Iraqis and those who are working to secure the country's future," said Army Lt. Col. Christopher Garver, Multinational Force Iraq spokesman.

Also today in Iraq, coalition forces detained another 16 suspected terrorists during morning raids in Baghdad’s Sadr City neighborhood. The detainees captured in Sadr City are suspected members of a clandestine terrorist cell known for facilitating the transport of weapons and explosively formed penetrators from Iran to Iraq, as well as bringing militants from Iraq to Iran for terrorist training.

Four of the detainees tested positive for contact with explosives. Coalition officials cite intelligence reports indicating that one of the detainees is a key terrorist leader with ties to Iranian intelligence. This detainee is believed to be responsible for attacks on Iraqi civilians and Iraqi and coalition forces in Baghdad, officials said.

“We will seek out and find terrorists where they hide,” Garver said. “Removing the networks that bring in explosively formed penetrators is a top priority to protect the Iraqi people and the security forces that serve them.”

In operations yesterday, coalition forces operating in Baghdad killed two terrorists and detained 10 other people in raids targeting an al-Qaeda in Iraq car-bomb network.

The two men who were killed ran into a building and attempted to retrieve weapons visible inside. Coalition forces fired at the two men, killing them. Another suspected terrorist was detained on the scene, and three vehicles used to transport weapons and personnel for the terror cell were destroyed.

In five other raids conducted in Baghdad yesterday, coalition forces detained six suspected terrorists associated with the car-bomb network and destroyed two vehicles used to transport weapons and personnel for the cell. A related raid south of Tarmiyah netted three suspects tied to the terrorist group.

“Targeting the al Qaeda in Iraq (car-bomb) network is a top priority for coalition forces," Garver said. “We continue to work to reduce and eventually eliminate the ability of terrorists to attack innocent Iraqis.”

Meanwhile, Iraqi soldiers accompanied by coalition advisors seized four suspected al Qaeda operatives yesterday during raids on several residences in Saqlimiyah, officials said. No coalition or Iraqi troops were hurt in the operation.

Iraqi special operations troops detained four suspected assassins believed to be coordinating and conducting killings in the Baghdad area during a June 5 operation in Baghdad. While detaining the individuals, the Iraqi troops came under enemy fire. The Iraqi forces returned fire, and the engagement ended. No Iraqi or coalition forces, who’d served as advisors, were injured during the operation.

Read the entire story from the Dod here. Also from the DOD is this report on Iraqi police:

Iraq’s police force is seeing incremental improvements across the spectrum of its mandate, and the communities it serves are benefiting as a result, an official with the U.S. police-training mission said yesterday.

Tangible gains have been made in the police force’s relationships with the Iraqi ministries of defense and justice, judicial capacity is on the rise, corruption is being pursued internally, and the training program is continuing to expand, said Army Brig. Gen. David Phillips, deputy commander of the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team, in a conference call with online journalists and military “bloggers.”

The result is that day-to-day life in parts of Baghdad and Anbar province has improved dramatically in some cases as recruits continue to enter the police academies and enhanced police vigilance helps settle neighborhoods, Phillips said. . .

Read the entire articlehere. And here is an interesting report out of the 82nd Airborne about the building of the concrete walls in Baghdad's Adhamiyah neighborhood and its effects. Bill Rogio has an exceptional report on targeting Iranian proxies.

Now compare all of that reporting with this from today's Washington Post, "Suicide Attacks, Bombings Kill Dozens in Iraq":

Suicide attackers and car bombs struck targets in central, western and northern Iraq on Thursday, leaving at least 24 people dead and 42 wounded, Iraqi security officials said.

Gunmen also shot three professors from Islamic University in Baghdad, . . . and killed the head of the Education Ministry's department of research and development as he drove to work, police said.

"It is part of the campaign to attack every positive thing in Iraq," said an Education Ministry spokesman, Basil al-Khatib, who blamed the attacks on extremists who oppose modernity and want to drive "all elite and educated people from Iraq." He complained that the national government "is not acting" to prevent further attacks against teachers, "it only talks."

At least 211 university professors and 104 officials from the ministry have been assassinated in Iraq since the war started in March 2003, Khatib said. In addition, 91 professors have been kidnapped, and their fate is unknown, he said.

. . . On Thursday, gunmen fatally shot Sahar al-Haideri, a journalist working for the independent Aswat al-Iraqi news agency, . . . Her death followed the killings of 11 reporters and other media workers in Iraq in May, the deadliest month of the war for journalists, according to Reporters Without Borders.

In another sign of the fractures in Iraqi society, gunmen stormed a barbershop in the southern port city of Basra, . . . The barber was the 18th killed in Basra this year, the official said. The profession has been targeted by both Sunni and Shiite extremists seeking to punish Iraqis who embrace Western styles and customs.

Thursday's bombings began in Rabiyah, a northern town on the border with Syria, when a suicide attacker exploded a truck bomb at the local police headquarters, killing nine people and wounding 22, according to Nineveh provincial police commander Mohammed al-Wagga.

A short time later, a car bomber attacked a joint Iraqi-U.S. military facility, killing four British security contractors, he said. An official at the British Embassy said he was unaware of the incident.

A truck bomb exploded in a suicide attack at the traffic police headquarters outside Ramadi, about 55 miles west of Baghdad, on Thursday morning, killing three policemen and injuring four, Anbar provincial police Col. Jubair Rasheed said.

In a fourth attack, a car bomb exploded around lunchtime outside a falafel restaurant in the Shiite Talibiya neighborhood of eastern Baghdad, killing at least five people and wounding 16.

And a truck bomb explosion in Abu Ghraib, about 15 miles west of Baghdad, destroyed a Shiite mosque, damaged a Sunni one and killed two Iraqi army soldiers and an Iraqi civilian, the U.S. military reported.

. . . The U.S. military reported Thursday that an American soldier was killed and two were injured Wednesday by a roadside bomb in southwest Baghdad. The death brings to 3,504 the number of U.S. military deaths in Iraq since the March 2003 invasion, . . . A British soldier was killed and three were wounded Thursday by small-arms fire northwest of Basra, . . . It was the 150th British military death in the war, according to icasualties.org.

The U.S. military also reported a major airstrike and ground attack Tuesday that killed 19 insurgents sheltered in a house near Baqubah, about 25 miles northeast of the capital. A military statement said the insurgents had fired on a U.S.-Iraqi security patrol with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades, after which U.S. and Iraqi forces attacked the house with bombs, rockets and small arms. Two Iraqi army soldiers were killed in the fighting and two people, including a U.S. soldier, were injured.

Do believe me when I say that MSM reporting could well be written by al Qaeda. It is an utter travesty.

Then there was the insanity - the senate confirmation hearings for LTG Douglas Lute as war czar. Lute, an armor officer, does not support the counterinsurgency operations and seems to have a dim view of the Iraq government, all of which provided more fodder for Senate Democrats to attack the war in advance of September. It is kind of like hiring Ted Bundy to babysit your children. Just one in a long string of inexplicable acts by George Bush. And the insanity goes on . . .

Read More...

Summary only...

Jasser Finds Danger & Dissimulation In Pew Poll On Islam In America

M. Zudi Jasser, former U.S. Naval Officer and President of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, examines the recent Pew poll on Islam in America. He finds, on one hand, the poll results very disconcerting, and on the other hand, flawed in the formulation by Islamists invited by Pew to assist in developing the questions:

Significant national attention has turned in the past week toward dissecting all of the data from the Pew Research Center’s study on an array of subjects concerning Muslim Americans. The full Pew study, Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, contains information on a number of issues of great importance to our direction in the ideological struggle against political Islam (Islamism). The data obtained by Pew, first and foremost, demonstrates the necessity of future polls of Muslim Americans, perhaps with more of an ideological focus on the exact place of Islamism, anti-Islamism, Shari’a and Muslim reform and enlightenment issues in the context of the practice of Islam in 2007.

The Pew poll touches on the periphery of some of these issues but leaves the reader to infer a number of conclusions on political Islam from the data. The focus of most media attention thus far has simply been the study’s indicators regarding the threat of terrorism from the Muslim population and its counterbalancing data on the apparent general assimilation of Muslims.

Optimism v. Realism: Where’s the counter-jihad?

Optimistic mainstream media (MSM) have understandably focused on the study’s positive aspects indicating that the vast majority of Muslims are peaceful, assimilated, and condemn terrorism. This optimism is necessary because that same majority holds the keys toward decreasing the numbers of the more troubling minority. The realists, however, did the math and raised valid concerns about the implications of the number of potential militant Islamists. The statistics reveal that 1% of the study’s estimated 2.3 million Muslim Americans say that suicide bombings against civilian targets are “often justified” and 7% felt, “sometimes justified.” This demonstrates a potential threat of 184,000 potential Islamist terrorists in the United States. The study does nothing to connect the imminent responsibility of the remaining 92% in changing, deprogramming, and defeating this radical 8%. Moreover, even more concerning is the total 26% of those younger than 30 who even ‘rarely’ find justification for terrorism. Again, we find no questions or conclusions from Pew about the responsibility of the remaining 74% to lead a counter-jihad.

Similarly, 5% of Muslim Americans expressed “somewhat favorable opinions of Al Qaeda”. Yet, only 63% of foreign-born Muslims were able to muster “strong hostility” toward Al Qaeda, with 52% of all native-born Muslims, and a shocking 36% of African American Muslims doing the same. The need for a counter-jihad becomes all the more relevant in this context with such an “underwhelming” majority of Muslims demonstrating the moral courage simply to identify the clearest enemy of America in our time. Certainly, the seeds of leadership in this counter-jihad will come from these Muslims who have the courage to name Al Qaeda and have the courage unequivocally to condemn terrorism as an immoral act with never a justification.

Thus, from here, what is so sorely needed in reviewing the data, and what few have done, is actually to begin to connect the study’s plethora of revealed ideologies of Muslim Americans diagnostically to the radicalized minority over which so many have expressed concern. To discuss the 184,000 potential terrorists (FOA - friends of Al Qaeda, if you will) in a vacuum, with no ideological connections or offshoots from the Muslim majority is to flail helplessly in post 9-11 diagnostics with no insight into cause, effect, or treatment. FOA are not a crime problem.

There can be no other explanation as to how it is that Al Qaeda, basically a euphemism for the whole of radical Islam, is able continually to regenerate itself like a metastatic cancer immune to any chemotherapy. The Fort Dix Six had no apparent contact with Al Qaeda. Yet their ends, their means and execution were the same as Al Qaeda. The only common thread is radical Islam, which is a militant offshoot of an even more common thread - political Islam.

Islamist Insiders obfuscate the dangers of political Islam

The Pew Research Center interestingly sought the advice of some known leading Islamists such as Ingrid Mattson and Ihsan Bagby. Islamists will often try to obfuscate or deny the threat and the goals of political Islam. It doesn’t seem that any anti-Islamist Muslims had any input on the poll, which perhaps would have clarified the results on political Islam. Regardless, the data still did not camouflage the problem of political Islam, and the hope from the study that there is a significant plurality if not a majority of Muslims who are potential anti-Islamists. We ignore the signs and symptoms of the threat of political Islam in the Pew study at our own peril.

Make no mistake: current Islamist leadership in America are already running away from the reality of political Islam revealed in this study. Ingrid Mattson, an adviser to the study and the head of the Islamic Society of North America released her “Reflection on the 2007 Pew Report”. Her self-described ‘Call for Moral Leadership’ was not in any way a call against the ends of political Islam. It was not a clear, solitary call of moral courage against Islamist extremism. It was, rather, an apologetic against terrorism, which had the audacity to claim a moral equivalency of Al Qaeda’s terror means with the claim by America’s politicians that American armed forces also employ torture! Ms. Mattson equates the political ends of Al Qaeda with the ends of our armed forces intending to liberate Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan. In a sweeping statement of grand moral equivalency between terror and torture, she says, “We have allowed the appropriation of sinful and immoral means for political ends.”

Nowhere in Mattson’s political screed presented under the laudable guise of theological leadership of “imagining of a new Heroism” is she actually able to condemn the ends of America’s enemies—the Islamic state. Yet, she is able to juxtapose in an insulting equation a discussion of the barbaric evil of the likes of Al Qaeda with an admonition to our legislators and President to stop supporting torture—a classical Islamist doublespeak mixture of religion and politics. Such juxtaposition of radical Islamism with American political leadership feeds directly from the demagogic techniques of Islamists in order to speak to their Islamist constituencies under the guise of even-handedness. This technique actually perpetuates a greater divide between Muslims and the general American public. Is it any wonder that political Islam is thriving and continuing to provide political fodder for its militant offshoots when such a mixture of religion and politics speaks for American Muslims? . . .

Reviewing the Pew data in the context of political Islam

On the war in Afghanistan

The penetration and influence of Islamism (political Islam) is deep in the American Muslim community. While most of the media focused on Muslim opinions of the Iraq war. Only 35% of American Muslims supported the war in Afghanistan while 61% of the general public did. The only explanation for the difference between Muslims and the general American public who are exposed to the same anti-war MSM is the impact of rampantly political sermons and the additional consequences of the constant barrage viewed by Muslims of national and international Muslim media (from Al Jazeera to CAIR’s eletter) against the war.

Muslim media repetitively defined the conflict in Afghanistan in terms of a “war against Muslims” rather than a war against the oppressive Taliban, who would not give up the sworn enemy of the American people - Al Qaeda. Unfortunately, within this much deeper discussion is evidence that political Islam brings with it loyalty to the ummah (the transnational Muslim nation or community) over loyalty to one’s own nation even when our national interests in a just war such as in Afghanistan are clear and moral.

On extremism

The study repeatedly demonstrated a significant direct correlation between religious observance and extremism. The Islamists have and will dismiss the extremism as ‘political extremism” having nothing to do with the practice of religion. While to a moral, spiritual Muslim, extremism and coercion is an anathema, this correlation, however, between Muslim observance and extremism is a direct indicator of the lethality of political Islam (Islamism). Political Islam is a dominating societal and governmental ideology that is wedded to and exploits the theology of Islam while trying to overwhelm the voices of reason, pluralism, humility, and secularism. Islamists in their typical denials will reject the correlation of extremist views with religious observance as misguided or purely political unrelated to religious practice. They cannot have it both ways—that is to live and practice in a toxic mixture of religion and politics and then say that the dominating political ideology of Islamism has no connection to the religious (immoral leadership).

The Pew study confirms this. Its indicators of political Islam—opinions of the use of mosques for social and political speech, attitudes against the war in Afghanistan, conspiracy theory explanations for 9-11, and an affection for big government (i.e.) - all correlated directly with religious observance. Thus, the pervasiveness of Islamist political ideologies (shown in the Pew study) within the Muslim community provides a substantial stimulus for radical Islam and its extremism. It only stands to reason that a pervasive political ideology that cloaks itself in religion will have an order of magnitude toward greater fertilization within the religious practicing community than outside it. Obviously, the more immoral the religious leadership and its apologetics, the more political Islam will spread. Thus the correlation between religious observance and extremism is clear. Certainly, some Islamists may preach non-violence, which can serve as a short-term prevention of militancy. But in the long term, the only antidote is the separation of the political from the religious in Islam.

. . . Islamism can only be defeated by a counter-jihad from a spiritual Islam devoid of the political and governmental realms and led by a universally moral, pluralistic, and humane construct from the God of Abraham. . .

On conspiracy theories

How is it that only 40% of Muslim respondents would identify the fact that Arabs carried out the attacks of 9-11? This cannot be ignored. More specifically, 32% of American Muslims refused to answer and 28% were in complete disbelief that Arabs did it. Again, the more religious the Muslim American, the more likely they are to believe in this conspiracy theory. So if Islam is to provide moral courage for making brave stances against evil, significant concern should be raised that political Islam and its propaganda have a significant impact upon moral clarity.

Political Islam at its core thrives on dishonesty, fabricated enemies, and conspiracies in a world of spin over truth and corruption over morality. At the center of mechanisms of denial, is the creation of fantastic stories, which create false assumptions and feed the ego of those with inferiority complexes. In order to exert control, theocracy (political Islam) must manipulate information and create enemies while uniting the masses in Machiavellian ends - in many ways planting the seeds for fascism. . .

On Mosque and state

A significant percentage (43%) of Muslims felt that mosques should express their views on social and political questions. The fact that 49% felt that the mosque should not be involved in politics gives hope to the dream that ultimately the primary vehicle of religious education, the mosque, can possibly be cleansed of the toxic Islamist influence. However, the penetration of political Islam is not only in the mosque, it includes the Muslim media, and Islamist political organizations. So the 49% is as small as it is possibly because only 40% of Muslims frequent the mosque. Therefore, their answers may have more to do with idealized perceptions of the mosque than of the faith of Islam and the need to separate religion and politics. More study is desperately needed in this question.

For the very reason that we are daily faced with national Muslim organizations who exploit the faith of Islam for their own heavy political agendas, it is more and more essential to dissect the current reality and telescope the process by which anti-Islamist Muslims can lead the extrication of spiritual, moral Islam from political Islam.

On American Nationalism

When American Muslims were asked whether they were American or Muslim first, 47% felt they were Muslim first and only 28% American first. The study compared this to Christians who reported 42% as being Christian first. This comparison is unfortunately not valid in this context. A better comparison would have been to ask Muslims and Christians whether the United States should be “under God,” “under Islam,” or “under Christianity.” It would stand to reason that while most Christians would say ‘under God,’ far more Muslims would say, ‘under Islam.’ In the concept of political Islam, the theocratic Islamic state has not been reformed or defeated in the way the Christian theocracy has in American history. Those 47% of Muslims pose a more significant ideological threat in the context of current Islamic thinking vis-à-vis the state.

This is especially true when considering the ends sought by radical Islamists. - theocracy over our pluralistic democracy. The study demonstrates this by showing that “13% of those who think of themselves primarily as Muslim believe that suicide bombing to defend Islam from its enemies can be often or sometimes justified compared with 4% of those who are American first.” Additionally, those who identified themselves as Muslim first were twice as likely to believe that Arabs did not commit 9/11 (40%-20%). Those who were American first were much more likely to accept that 9/11 was committed by Arabs (61%). Again we see a significant correlation between religious observance, radicalism, and Islamism.

Political Islam is the problem. Identification of nationality as Muslim is fertile soil for conspiracy theories. The only antidote to the spread of Islamism is a counter-jihad, which includes a strong American nationalism embodied in a belief in liberty, freedom, and pluralism under God. American nationalism alone is not an antidote because Islamists may have theocratic goals for their own American patriotism. American nationalism can defeat Islamism only if it also takes back the mantle of faith from the Islamists with the growth of a moral, spiritual Islam that can combat the immorality of terrorism in a counter-jihad from within a nation under God but anti-Islamist.

The Future

While political Islam may seem to be pervasive, it is not overwhelming. The untold story in this poll is the hope it gives to anti-Islamist Muslims. As noted, a plurality of Muslims - 49% - believe that mosques should stay out of politics. Interestingly, most of those are the foreign born Muslims versus the native-born Muslims who seem to have grown up in Islamist incubators without understanding the harms of political Islam, which so many immigrants lived through.

If we are going to win this global conflict, analysis of studies like this one should not be overly negative or positive and should be reviewed through the Islamist lens to understand the context—the root cause (Islamism), effect (radicalization), and treatments (a counter-jihad separating spiritual Islam from political Islam). A morally clear spiritual Islam can eliminate politics from the domain of faith, which should be only a personal journey of individual Muslims to God. This process requires ijtihad, which is a re-interpretation of scripture in light of modern day. It also requires imams and scholars with moral courage to denounce each and every suicide operation around the world as immoral, un-Islamic, and barbaric without any justification - ever.

. . . One can only hope that the next study of the American Muslim population will include a much more probative questioning, specifically with regard to political Islam in order to distinguish how many Muslims believe in theocracy over pluralistic democracy. Current Islamist leadership in mosques and national political organizations like CAIR (Council on American-Islamic Relations), MPAC (Muslim Public Affairs Council), MAS (Muslim American Society), or ISNA (Islamic Society of North America) have no personal interest in pushing an exposure of political Islam since it embodies the daily practice of their organizations.

With time, the MSM, the government, and the general American public will have to become more savvy regarding the need to expose the insidious threat of political Islam and its causative association with radical Islamism.

Read the entire story here. It should be noted that, in a Fox News story, Walid Phares offers similar warnings and a similar criticism of the poll.

Read More...

Summary only...