Who & Why - A Second Bombing At The Samarra Mosque

The downward spiral of sectarian violence in Iraq began in February 2006 with an al Qaeda in Iraq bombing of the Samarra Mosque, one of the holiest of Shiite shrines. It had long been the stated goal of al Qaeda to fan the flames of civil war, and with that bombing, they came close to succeeding. Repair work on the Mosque was planned, but never started.

In the aftermath of the February 2006 bombing, and as part of the Iraqi security plan, the mission to guard the Mosque was charged to an Iraqi Police Battalion. Nonetheless, this morning, two explosions at the base of the mosque brought down two of the minarets still standing from the original blast. Who did this and why did they do it are two questions with several possible answers. This from the Washington Post:

Early morning blasts Wednesday destroyed two minarets at the same Shiite shrine in Samarra where an attack last year demolished the mosque's gilded dome and plunged the country into a wave of deadly sectarian violence.

The 9 a.m. explosions at the revered Askariya shrine in Samarra, about 65 miles north of Baghdad, is the sort of event that could spark a spiral of retaliatory bloodshed. . . .

The Feb. 22, 2006 attack on the shrine -- often referred to as the Golden Mosque because of its brilliant golden dome -- was a seminal moment in the four-year Iraq war, sparking a vicious cycle of bloodshed that has never fully stopped. In the 16 months since, thousands of Iraqis -- and perhaps tens of thousands -- have been killed in Sunni-Shiite fighting.

. . . Fearing a backlash from the latest attack, the Iraqi government imposed an indefinite curfew across Baghdad starting 3 p.m. Wednesday. There were no immediate reports of retaliatory violence, and no reports that anyone was injured in the attack at the shrine.

"This is a terrorist attack that is aimed at inciting sectarian crisis, and it is the work of a foreign agenda whose aim is to stoke sectarian strife, instability and a collapse of the political process," said Hussein Al Musawi, spokesman for the Shiite Political Council, an umbrella group of Shiite political parties.

"There is an obvious failure on the part of the Iraqi security forces, and the multinationals, to guard these shrines and to deal the terrorists groups a blow, and to strike with an iron fist against the terrorists."

. . . In response to Wednesday's attack, the entire Iraqi security force responsible for guarding the mosque, the 3rd Battalion of the Salahaddin Province police, was detained for investigation, Iraqi law enforcement officials said. The collapse of the two minarets appeared to have been caused by explosive charges placed at their bases.

. . . After Wednesday's explosions, Iraqi security forces patrolled the city, firing in the air and announcing the curfew from loudspeakers mounted on jeeps. In Baghdad and elsewhere, Shiite mosques broadcast calls for demonstrations.

In a sign of the sectarian tensions quickly provoked by the incident, members of the Iraqi security forces, which are dominated by Shiites, yelled threats at Samarra residents, blaming them for the destruction of the mosque and threatening revenge. Some citizens, meanwhile, hurled remarks back, asking how anyone could destroy the minarets when the entire religious complex was being so carefully guarded by Iraqi security forces.

The mosque, one of the four most revered in Iraq, has been heavily guarded by Iraqi troops ever since the destruction of its gilded dome in the 2006 attack.

Radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr called for peaceful demonstrations and reconciliation within Iraq's warring factions to mark the minarets' destruction. In a written statement, Sadr said Sunnis and Shiites should unite and declared that no Sunni Arab could have been responsible for the attack on the Shiite shrine.

He claimed that U.S. occupation forces bore responsibility for the blasts, though the precise nature of that alleged responsibility was not made clear.

"We declare a three-day mourning period . . . and shout Allahu Akbar (God is greater) from Sunni and Shiite mosques," Sadr said in the statement.

U.S. military spokesman Lt. Col. Christopher Garver said that U.S. forces were assisting the Iraqi government in responding to the attack and had provided a team to help assess the damage. Although there were U.S. troops in the region, he said, "The security for the shrine itself is an Iraqi responsibility." . . .

Read the entire storyhere. There are two possible motivations for this bombing.

The first is to reignite sectarian violence and to undo the significant gains made by the surge. Although it is clear that al Qaeda in Iraq carried out the initial attack, it is far less clear who carried out this second attack. Al Qaeda in Iraq, Moqtada al Sadr, Iran and Congressional Democrats all have a vested interest in seeing the surge fail, and it would not be beyond at least the first three to have conducted this bombing. Given that the battalion guarding the mosque is made up of Shiites, it seems likely either Sadr's militia or an Iranian proxy carried out this attack.

The second possible motivation is a false flag operation by Sadr to use the bombing as a means of establishing his bona fides as a national political figure looking out for the interests of Sunni and Shia alike. Given his quick response to the bombing and his calls for peace, this is plausible. If so, it would mark Sadr as having far more intelligence and nuance then I believe he actually possesses. That, or this could have been planned on his behalf for that purpose by his Iranian handlers if, as seems likely, Sadr is a tool of the Khomeinists at this point.

In either event, it just does not seem likely that, in the absence of vociferous rhetoric played out across Iraqi air waves, that this second attack against the still unrepaired Samarra mosque will draw anywhere near the same ire of the nation as was caused by the first attack. It bears watching carefully who attempts to capitalize on this bombing, how they do it and to what end. That may go a long way to telling us who are the true culprits.

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Lieberman & The Military Target Iran While Democrats Dither

The Democrats, led by Harry Reid, let us all know once again why they cannot be trusted with our national security or the conduct of a war. On Sunday, Joe Lieberman, called for military strikes against Iran in response to the acts of war being daily committed by Iran against the US:

. . . "I think we've got to be prepared to take aggressive military action against the Iranians to stop them from killing Americans in Iraq," Lieberman told Bob Schieffer. "And to me, that would include a strike into... over the border into Iran, where we have good evidence that they have a base at which they are training these people coming back into Iraq to kill our soldiers."

. . . If the U.S. does not act against Iran, "they'll take that as a sign of weakness on our part and we will pay for it in Iraq and throughout the region and ultimately right here at home," Lieberman said.

. . . "We can tell them we want them to stop that, but if there's any hope of the Iranians living according to the international rule of law and stopping, for instance, their nuclear weapons development, we can't just talk to them," Lieberman said. "If they don't play by the rules, we've got to use our force, and to me that would include taking military action to stop them from doing what they're doing."

Read the entire story here. Joe Lieberman is spot on in his assessment (see here and here), But Harry Reid responded, once again embracing peace at all costs before the '08 election. He would give Iran a free pass to continue engaging in acts that kill our soldiers and destabilize Iraq, calling for diplomacy and a regional conference because "[t]he invasion of [Iran] is only going to destabilize that part of the world more." Perhaps Mr. Reid has forgotten that the precipitous withdrawal from Iraq that he proposes for partisan political gain will be the single greatest destabilizing act in the Middle East imaginable.

UPDATE: Bill Rogio writes that the Army now has proof beyond any reasonable doubt of Iran's complicity in the Karbala raid that ended in the death of five U.S. soldiers. Satelite photos show the Iran built a mock up of the target area in a city where they have been training Iraqi militants.

Meanwhile, the left are beginning to realize that, one, their Presidential candidates are going to be attacked on a daily basis for their incredible weakness on issues relating to national security and terrorism, and two, that these candidates have very little in the way of substantive response to the charges. The WSJ has the story of the left's conundrum here.

And on a final note, the Jerusalem Post is reporting that the U.S. military has drawn up its plans for a strike on Iran in response to their continuing quest for nuclear weapons:

Predicting that Iran will obtain a nuclear weapon within three years and claiming to have a strike plan in place, senior American military officers have told The Jerusalem Post they support President George W. Bush's stance to do everything necessary to stop the Islamic Republic's race for nuclear power.

. . . A high-ranking American military officer told the Post that senior officers in the US armed forces had thrown their support behind Bush and believed that additional steps needed to be taken to stop Iran.

Predictions within the US military are that Bush will do what is needed to stop Teheran before he leaves office in 2009, including possibly launching a military strike against its nuclear facilities.

. . . According to a high-ranking American military officer, the US Navy and Air Force would play the primary roles in any military action taken against Iran. One idea under consideration is a naval blockade designed to cut off Iran's oil exports.

The officer said that if the US government or the UN Security Council decided on this course of action, the US Navy would most probably not block the Strait of Hormuz - a step that would definitely draw an Iranian military response - but would patrol farther out and turn away tankers on their way to load oil.

. . . The US officer said that perhaps even more dangerous to Israel and the Western world than Iranian nukes was the possibility that a terrorists cell associated with al-Qaida or global jihad would acquire a highly radioactive "dirty bomb" or a vial of deadly chemical or biological agents. The officer said al-Qaida was gaining a strong foothold in the Middle East and that Israel was being surrounded by global jihad elements in Lebanon, Jordan and Sinai.

"Iran is a state-sponsored type of terrorism that can be dealt with," he said, adding that it was far more difficult to strike at the source of an isolated terrorist cell. . . .

Read the entire article here. Let us hope this article is accurate. It is difficult to imagine anything more dangerous to the world then a nuclear armed Iran.

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Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani versus Iran

I posted here on the significance of the formal change of loyalty of Iraq's largest Shia political party, SCIRI. This organization, created in Iran and sworn to fealty towards Iran's Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has now changed their name to the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and officially broken with Iran, pledging now to take their guidance from Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Sistani's philosophy of apolitical Shia'ism is directly at odds with that of Iran's theocracy. The Boston Globe today details the importance of Sistani, and why the Iranian government is afraid of him:

Iran's ruling clerics have long prided themselves on running the world's only Shi'ite Muslim state -- a state that imposes religion, dictating what imams can preach, what the media can report, and what people can wear.

So some Iranians are intrigued by the more freewheeling experiment in Shi'ite empowerment taking place across the border in Iraq, where -- Iraq's myriad problems aside -- imams can say whatever they want in political Friday sermons, newspapers and satellite channels regularly slam the government, and religious observance is respected and encouraged but not required.

In Tehran's storied central bazaar, an increasing number of merchants are sending their religious donations, a 20 percent tithe expected from all who can spare it, to Iraq's most senior Shi'ite cleric -- rather than to clerics closer to Iran's state power structure, said Jawad al-Ghaie, 48, a wholesaler of false eyelashes and nail extensions and a respected lay donor.

Speaking carefully to avoid directly challenging the Iranian government, he and several fellow merchants suggested that Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani holds more spiritual sway because of his lifelong commitment to quietism. That is the school of thought that says Shi'ite leaders should stay out of government, and Sistani has stuck to it despite the great temptation to wade into the chaos of Iraqi politics.

Haamed Hussein Warraqi, another merchant, contrasted the different ways in which Sistani and the Iranian religious authorities deal with overly exuberant revelers on Arbayeen, an important Shi'ite holiday. In Iran, he said, riot police line the streets to rein in men who cut their scalps with knives -- a show of mourning that the Iranian government and some religious scholars deem Islamically incorrect.

In contrast, "Sistani uses the authority of his word," said Warraqi, 27. "The domain of Sistani is in religion, and he is obeyed by the people. Here they want to rule according to politics. That's why they have to use the riot police."

"Any time religion is imposed by the government," Ghaie added, "there is a bad reaction."

. . . But ever since US-sponsored elections brought the Shi'ite majority to power, Iraq's imperfect liberation has quietly influenced the debate among religious Shi'ites about the role of religion in government .

After Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini founded a state that rests on his concept of velayat e faqi, or guardianship of the jurist. There are elections and parliamentary debates, but ultimate authority rests with a supreme leader who is appointed by a council of clerics.

Traditionally, Shi'ites have believed that clerics should stay out of politics until the return of the Mahdi, the last of the revered early Shi'ite imams, who disappeared in the ninth century. Shi'ites believe he went into hiding and will someday reveal himself.

Only he can establish a perfect Islamic state, according to traditional believers -- including some in the Tehran bazaar, whose influential religious merchant class backed the revolution but has since grown more skeptical of the ruling clerics.

"Only the Mahdi is the genuine leader," said Ghaie's brother Mohammad, 45, whose family, like many Iranian merchants, has lived in both Iran and Iraq over generations.

Expressing such opinions is dangerous: Several prominent religious scholars -- chief among them Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri -- are under house arrest or other official sanctions for opposing clerical rule or proposing limits on it.

The quietist philosophy suited disempowered Shi'ites, who through most of their history lived under Sunni powers. Shi'ites are a minority among Muslims and within all modern Middle Eastern states except Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain.

But now, in Iraq, Shi'ites are witnessing a new alternative: They can defend their rights at the ballot box, without establishing a religious state.

. . . "We believe that politics is separate from religion," said Iraq's ambassador to Iran, Mohammed Majid al-Sheikh. "Of course there are debates about this. If Iran wants to take on these debates, it will benefit. And I could say that the experiment of Iraq will ripple throughout the Middle East."

Iran has worked hard to influence Iraq. US officials have accused it of fomenting violence there. Analysts say Iran welcomes low-grade chaos in Iraq in part to prevent the emergence of a democratic Shi'ite alternative that could embolden Iranian reformists, while at the same time courting Shi'ite Iraqis by presenting itself as a stable and benign neighbor.

But influence is a two-way street, especially between two countries whose shrine cities and capitals have been tied by trade and pilgrimage for centuries. About 1,500 Iranians go to Iraq on pilgrimage every day, Sheikh said. The Ghaie brothers went recently and were impressed to see the parade of Iraqi politicians visiting Sistani's modest house in Najaf -- voluntarily -- for advice.

Last month, the Iranian press reported, Jalaluddin Taheri, a dissident cleric who resigned as Isfahan's Friday prayer leader in 2002 after criticizing the regime as corrupt and autocratic, went to Najaf to pay respects to Sistani.

The representative of Iraq's most pro-Iran political party, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, touted Iraq's freer system. . . .

Read the entire story here. It would seem that one goal of the war in Iraq - to put in place a democracy, even though imperfect and under seige from many forces, including Iran's theocracy - is having an impact. Do we really want to sacrifice Iraq's Shia's to Iran's theocracy?

(H/T Instapundit)

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A Significant Political Development in Iraq as the SCIRI Goes Local

There was a very positive political development Friday involving Iraq's largest Shia political party, the Supreme Counsel of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. The SCIRI was originally a resistance organization formed in the 1990's by Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al Hakim. Al Hakim had fled to Iran to escape a death sentence from Saddam Hussein. With the support of Iran's theocracy, al Hakim formed a political organization, the SCIRI, that pledged to take direction from the Supreme Giude of Iran. The organization also had a military wing, the Badr Brigade. Anyone viewing the situation in 2003 would likely conclude that SCIRI was an Iranian proxy along the lines of Hezbollah. Events since 2003 have proven otherwise.

SCIRI joined Iraq's political process following the 2003 invasion. While the Badr Brigade pledged to disarm, they did not do so. Nonetheless, SCIRI has not engaged in the extreme anti-American rhetoric of Iran's other best friend in Iraq, Sadr, nor have they engaged in any sort of major hostilities with coalition forces. Actually, to the contrary, they have assisted coalition forces in several notable instances, though the slate is not clean. The Badr Brigades have been accused of playing a significant role in reprisal attacks against Sunnis in the months following the bombing of the Golden Mosque. But, even if true, there is no evidence of any ongoing major role in the sectarian violence.

Politically, the SCIRI has proven far more pragmatic then its religious origins and relationship to Iran's brand of Khomeinist political Shia'ism would lead one to project. Indeed, in December, 2006, in order to stop the havoc caused by the ever increasing sectarian attacks being carried out by the Sadr militia, SCIRI reached across the aisle to Sunni and Kurdish legislators to discuss the possibility of forming a coalition government that would isolate Sadr and his 30 member bloc in Parliament. This may well have been a critical event in moving Prime Minister Maliki to break with Sadr and support the counterinsurgency effort that today sees Sadr hiding in Iran while the U.S. military and Iraqi forces occupy Sadr City.

Now the latest acts of SCIRI suggest a much cleaner break with the Iranian theocracy:

Iraq's biggest Shi'ite party on Saturday pledged its allegiance to the country's top Shi'ite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, in a move that would distance it from Shi'ite Iran where it was formed.

The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) said it had introduced significant policy changes and changed its name to the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) -- dropping the word "Revolution".

Party officials told Reuters on Friday that the changes were aimed at giving the party more of an Iraqi flavor and to reflect the changing situation in the country since the U.S.-led invasion toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003.

They said the party had been close to Sistani for some time, but a two-day conference on Baghdad that ended on Friday had formalized relations with the influential cleric.

"We cherish the great role played by the religious establishment headed by Grand Ayatollah Sayed Ali al-Sistani ... in preserving the unity of Iraq and the blood of Iraqis and in helping them building a political system based on the constitution and law," said Rida Jawad al-Takki, a senior group member, who read out the party's decisions to reporters.

The party pledged to follow the guidance of the Shi'ite establishment, he said.

Sistani, a reclusive figure who lives in the Iraqi holy Shi'ite city of Najaf, is the spiritual leader of Iraq's majority Shi'ites. He rarely makes public statements but his utterances are closely monitored by his followers.

Officials said the party, which was formed in Iran in the 1980s to oppose Saddam, had previously taken its guidance from the religious establishment of Welayat al Faqih, led by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran.

They said the party had been close to Sistani for some time, but a two-day conference on Baghdad that ended on Friday had formalized relations with the influential cleric.

"We cherish the great role played by the religious establishment headed by Grand Ayatollah Sayed Ali al-Sistani ... in preserving the unity of Iraq and the blood of Iraqis and in helping them building a political system based on the constitution and law," said Rida Jawad al-Takki, a senior group member, who read out the party's decisions to reporters.

The party pledged to follow the guidance of the Shi'ite establishment, he said.

Sistani, a reclusive figure who lives in the Iraqi holy Shi'ite city of Najaf, is the spiritual leader of Iraq's majority Shi'ites. He rarely makes public statements but his utterances are closely monitored by his followers.

Officials said the party, which was formed in Iran in the 1980s to oppose Saddam, had previously taken its guidance from the religious establishment of Welayat al Faqih, led by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran. . . .

Read the entire story here. This is all very good news. Grand Ayatollah Sistani, himself an Iranian, is at odds with Iran's theocracy. He subscribes to the traditional principles of apolitical Shia'ism, which Khomeini shredded when he established a clerical regime in Iran following the 1979 revolution. Indeed, according to the Middle East Institute, Sistani's belief in non-political Shia'sm present "a serious threat to Iran’s Islamic Republic." Thus, for example, Sistani has refused to involve himself in criticizing or negating political proposals for de-baathification that would open the way for Sunnis to retake positions in government. The SIIC formal turn towards Sistani and break with Iran's theocracy is very significant. On its face, this move by 'SIIC' seems a very positive political development indeed.

(H/T Dinah Lord)

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Tightening The Iranian Screw & Screwing The Iranian Economy

Who would have thought that Ahmedinejad himself, the Supreme Mouth of Iran, would turn out to be our best agent in the effort to effect regime change. I posted earlier that Iran's economy is bomb waiting to explode and Ahmedinejad's response, rather then economic reform, is to crack down throughout the country in the hopes of stopping the fuse from reaching the powder. Whose advising Mamoud anyway, the CIA? At any rate, now the Iranian author Amir Taheri weighs in on the topic to give us additional perspective:

For the past five weeks, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Islamic Moral Brigades have been clashing with groups of young Iranians on the streets of Tehran and other major cities over the government's crackdown on "immodest dress." The crackdown is seen by many Iranians as another step toward an even more suffocating social atmosphere in the crisis-stricken country. Both Mr. Ahmadinejad and his mentor, the "Supreme Leader" Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, claim that the way young Iranians dress is the most immediate threat to their Islamist dystopia.

. . . While social issues continue to poison life in the Islamic Republic, it is economic issues that spell the most trouble for Mr. Ahmadinejad's struggling presidency.

Last week tens of thousands of angry workers, forming an illegal umbrella organization, flexed their muscles against President Ahmadinejad on International Labor Day in Tehran and a dozen provincial capitals. Marching through the capital's streets, the workers carried a coffin draped in black with the legend "Workers' Rights" inscribed on it. They shouted "No to slave labor! Yes, to freedom and dignity!"

Mr. Ahmadinejad centered his 2005 presidential campaign on a promise to "bring the country's oil money to every family's dinner table." After the election his position was boosted by a dramatic rise in oil prices, providing him with more than $100 million a day in state revenues.

And, yet, all official statistics show that, with inflation running around 18% and unemployment jumping to more than 30%, the average Iranian is worse off than three years ago. . . Under President Ahmadinejad . . . the growth rate has dropped to around 3%--and that despite rising oil revenues.

Because it controls the oil revenue, which comes in U.S. dollars, the Islamic state has a vested interest in a weak national currency. (It could get more rials for the same amount of dollars in the domestic market.) Mr. Ahmadinejad has tried to exploit that opportunity by printing an unprecedented quantity of rials. Economists in Tehran speak of "the torrent of worthless rials" that Mr. Ahmadinejad has used to finance his extravagant promises of poverty eradication. The result has been massive flights of capital, mostly into banks in Dubai, Malaysia and Austria. Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahroudi, the Islamic Chief Justice, claims that as much as $300 billion may have left the country since President Ahmadinejad was sworn in.

According to Abbas Abdi, a Tehran researcher and loyal critic of the regime, Iran is experiencing its worst economic crisis since the late 1970s. The effects of this are seen in the slowdown in real-estate prices--the first since 1997, even in Tehran's prime districts. Printing money and spending on a no-tomorrow basis are not the only reasons for the crisis. President

Ahmadinejad's entire economic philosophy seems to be designed to do more harm than good. The president's favorite catchword is "khodkafa'I" or "self sufficiency." To the horror of most Iranians, especially the millions connected with the bazaars, who regard trade as the noblest of pursuits, Mr. Ahmadinejad insists that the only way Iran can preserve its "Islamic purity" is to reduce dependence on foreign commerce.

"Whatever we can produce we should do ourselves," the president likes to say. "Even if what we produce is not as good, and more costly." His rationale goes something like this: The global economic system is a Jewish-Crusader conspiracy to keep Muslim nations in a position of weakness and dependency. Thus, Muslims would do better by relying on their own resources even if that means lower living standards.

One of President Ahmadinejad's first moves was to freeze a six-year-old policy designed to help the Islamic Republic become a member of the World Trade Organization; in his book the WTO is just another "Jewish-Crusader" invention to cement the inferior position of Muslim economies. . . .

Convinced that Islam is destined for a "clash of civilizations" against the "Infidel"--led by the U.S., of course--President Ahmadinejad is determined to preserve what he regards as the Islamic Republic's "independence." One of his favorite themes is the claim that, forced to choose between freedom and independence, good Muslims would prefer the latter.

Khodkafa'i has had catastrophic results on many sectors of the Iranian industry. Unable to reduce, let alone stop, imports of mass consumer goods (including almost half of the nation's food) controlled by powerful mullahs and Revolutionary Guard commanders, President Ahmadinejad has tightened import rules for a range of raw materials and spare parts needed by factories across the nation. The policy has already all but killed the once-buoyant textile industry, destroying tens of thousands of jobs. It has also affected hundreds of small and medium-size businesses that, in some cases, have been unable to pay their employees for months.

Mr. Ahmadinejad has also used khodkafa'i as an excuse to freeze a number of business deals aimed at preventing the collapse of Iran's aging and semi-derelict oil and gas fields. He has also vetoed foreign participation in building oil refineries, forcing the Islamic Republic to import more than 40% of the refined petroleum products consumed in Iran. The prospect of a prolonged duel with the U.N., and possible military clash with the U.S., has also hurt the Iranian economy in the past six months.

One result of the president's weird policy is the series of strikes that have continued in Tehran and at least 20 other major cities since last autumn. Last year, one major strike by transport workers in Tehran brought the city of 15 million to a standstill for several days. Right now tens of thousands of workers in industries as diverse as gas refining, paper and newsprint, automobile, and copper mining are on strike.

President Ahmadinejad, however, is determined to impose what looks like a North Korean model on the Iranian economy. He has already dissolved the Syndicate of Iranian Employers (SKI) as a capitalist cabal, and plans to replace it with a government-appointed body. He is also pushing a new Labor Code through the Islamic Majlis (parliament) to replace the existing one written with the help of the International Labor Organization in the 1960s and amended in 1991.

The proposed text abolishes most of the rights won by workers throughout the world as a result of decades of social struggle and political reform. President Ahmadinejad believes that Western-style trade unions and employers' associations have no place in a proper Islamic society where the state, representing the will of Allah, can keep the "community of the faithful" free of class struggle, a typical affliction of "Infidel" societies.

Mr. Ahmadinejad's next coup will likely be a major privatization scheme affecting more than 40 public corporations across the country. He has promised to help the employees buy up to 10% of the shares. The rest will go to rich mullahs and Revolutionary Guard officers and their business associates, using low interest loans from state-owned banks. By the time the scheme is ready, however, the Islamic Republic may be facing too deep an economic crisis for anyone--even greedy mullahs and corrupt Revolutionary Guardsmen--to want to invest even a borrowed rial there.

Read the entire story here. It warms the heart to see the Supreme Mouth in action.

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Iran's Economic Time Bomb

Even as the Supreme Guide and the Supreme Mouth of Iran, Khamenei and Ahmedinejad respectively, seek to go nuclear, it may well be the local Iranians who go nuclear first. The clerics of Tehran and the IRGC have never paid that much attention to the economy, other then to squeeze every last dime from it that they can get. The Iranian economic system is famed for its corruption. But, up to now, subsidy of many everyday products, such as gas, have kept the middle class from joining the many segments of Iranian society ready to go into open revolt. Now as the economics get ever worse, the clerics are seeking to lay all the blame on Ahmedinejad and jettison him in hopes of keeping their skins intact and their bank accounts solvent (Allah be praised):

The play has ended and the 15 British pawns have returned to their families. The verdict is that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad neither enhanced his image as the divinely inspired warrior, who humbled the British lion, nor as the humanitarian, who freed the fifteen helpless prisoners.

The public was not fixated on the television drama that Ahmadinejad presented. Instead, Iranians are watching the prices of tomatoes and other basic necessities rising at between 20% and 40% per annum, while salaries and wages are scarcely moving.

On 21 May, the long awaited next economic blow will strike when gasoline rationing goes into effect. Iranian drivers will be limited to three litres per day at the subsidized cost of 40 cents per gallon. They will be permitted to purchase more than the three litres, but anything beyond the limit will be at a higher price. What that higher price will be has not been announced.

Rationing is the final admission by the Ahmadinejad administration that the program of promised prosperity that began a mere two years ago has failed and has brought only inflation, hardship and unemployment. The president’s preoccupation with verbal warfare with the rest of the world has done nothing to improve the lives of the Iranian public.

. . . [Ahmedinejad's recent] statements to the outside world may reduce the level of tension, but his political survival does not depend upon what foreigners think. His survival will be determined by what Iranians do; and they have spoken already. President Ahmadinejad’s days are numbered. His failed policies have alienated the lower income portion of the population that had been is strongest supporters.

He ignored in December the discontent of the public when his faction was defeated in the local elections. In spite of the severe losses, he continued his confrontations with the U.S. and the U.N.

Although he failed to heed the warning from the disenchanted voters, the conservative clergy that had elevated him from obscurity as the mayor of Tehran to the prominence of the presidency, were aware of his falling star. In January, while Ahmadinejad was visiting Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and other leaders with an anti-American view, the unelected Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei withdrew his support. Since then, the Supreme Leader has retreated into the safety of the shadows, while Ahmadinejad remains exposed to the public scorn.

Blame for everything that has gone wrong with the economy is being placed directly upon Ahmadinejad. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that “economics is for donkeys,” but he is demonstrating by his silence that he understands just how hard a hungry donkey can kick.

Ahmadinejad is learning that his former supporters have abandoned him and that is personal connections with the divine world will not protect him from the angry public. For that, he is relying upon the police and brute force. Any demonstration is being met with police batons and arrests. Opposing newspapers have been shut down; bloggers are being required to register. Once ignored morality codes are being enforced with a new vigour. Women wearing Western fashions are being warned that they can be flogged and barbers are under orders to provide only Islamic haircuts or face revocation of their business licenses.

The crack down gives signs of a pre emptive strike by a government preparing for worse conditions ahead. The real trouble is expected when the full impact of the rationing regulations is felt. During April, the first sign was an increase in the minimum charge by taxis that are often used for car-pooling. One more squeeze on already stretched home budgets could very easily be the breaking point that could send people into the streets to demand the resignation of the president. Saeed Laylaz, an Iranian economist, believes that rationing will stir social disorder and further economic stresses. His words are given credibility by the open grumbling that is being heard on the streets.

Khamenei and the “Grey Elite,” the conservative clergy that dominates much of Iranian life, seems to be preparing for Ahmadinejad’s departure. When the protesting demonstrators turn into the screaming mobs that want someone to pay for the public misfortune, the clergy will need a scapegoat; and no one fills that role better than Ahmadinejad, who has spent the two years of his administration cultivating the image of the firebrand.

Waiting in the wings to replace Ahmadinejad is Brigadier General Mohamed Baqer Qalibaf. Like Ahmadinejad, he was a member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG).

Mohamed Baqer Qalibaf was chief of the national police and succeeded Ahmadinejad to the office of mayor of Tehran. While Ahmadinejad has been portrayed often as a mystic, Mohamed Baqer Qalibaf is described as a “pragmatic conservative,” a man concerned with civic improvements and not with international confrontations.

. . . This is not a change in the essence of the system that gives the clergy its privileges. It is a change only of style in an effort to preserve the status quo, while giving the appearance of substantive change. A brief look at Qalibaf’s credentials reveals a man dedicated to the preservation of the current system.

How quickly the change comes will depend upon the determination of the demonstrators in the streets. When the mob demands blood, the Ayatollah will serve up the head of Ahmadinejad to satisfy the blood lust.

For the outside world, it should bring a respite from the months of threats and bluster. At that point, how much of a risk premium has been built into the price of crude oil should reveal itself. Whatever it is, the oil markets are likely to experience a softening in price, which actions by the George Bush Administration is making a more likely possibility.

. . . Now, we wait. Already, the grumbling in the streets has begun. Somewhere down the road in the near future, as people run out of gas, Ahmadinejad will run out of time. The neglected people will openly express their rage, and the pretence of change will come. It should for a while lower the pressure in the region; and it will all depend upon the anger of the mob.

Read the entire article here. My own personal suggestion to Khamenei and his corrupt and bloody clerics is that they pacify the mobs by suggesting that they eat some cake.

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More Turmoil in Iran's Theocracy

There is more turmoil and political machinations taking place in Iran's theocracy as a plan is afoot to unseat the tough talking but largely ineffectual Ahmedinejad from power.

A grand coalition of anti-government forces is planning a second Iranian revolution via the ballot box to deny President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad another term in office and break the grip of what they call the "militia state" on public life and personal freedom.

Encouraged by recent successes in local elections, opposition factions, democracy activists, and pro-reform clerics say they will bring together progressive parties loyal to former president Mohammad Khatami with so-called pragmatic conservatives led by Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani.

The alliance aims to exploit the president's deepening unpopularity, borne of high unemployment, rising inflation and a looming crisis over petrol prices and possible rationing to win control of the Majlis in general elections which are due within 10 months.

Parliament last week voted to curtail Mr Ahmadinejad's term by holding presidential and parliamentary elections simultaneously next year.

Though the move is likely to be vetoed by the hardline Guardian Council, it served notice of mounting disaffection in parliament.

But opposition spokesmen say their broader objective is to bring down the fundamentalist regime by democratic means, transform Iran into a "normal country", and obviate the need for any military or other US and western intervention. Rightwing political and religious forces, divided and dismayed by Mr Ahmadinejad's much-criticised performance, are already mobilising to meet the threat.

The movement amounts to the clearest sign yet within Iran that the country is by no means unified behind a president who has led it into confrontation with the west over the nuclear issue, while presiding over economic decline at home.

"The past two years have been a very bitter time for Iran," said Mohammad Atrianfar, a leading opposition figure with ties to Mr Rafsanjani, the former president now emerging as a likely future kingmaker in Iran.

"Ahmadinejad has done everything upside down - politics, economy, foreign policy - putting all our achievements at risk. He has done a lot of damage at home and abroad."

Mr Atrianfar said that a majority in the Majlis was now critical of the president and would certainly impeach him but for the support he enjoyed from the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

According to Ali Alavi of Siyasat-e Ruz newspaper, some 150 political activists, governors-general, former administration officials and dissident MPs drew up a coalition "victory strategy" at a secretive conference last month presided over by Mr Khatami.

The strategy envisaged "aggravation of the differences among the fundamentalists" and "constant criticism of Ahmadinejad" by "presenting a dark image of the country's affairs," Mr Alavi said.

Opposition sources said that a future reformist-pragmatist government would continue to maintain Iran's claim to nuclear energy and other "national rights" but would seek to settle disputes through talks.

Iran wanted a "normal" relationship with the rest of the world based on mutual respect, the opposition sources said.

In an oblique swipe at Mr Ahmadinejad, Mr Rafsanjani told the weekly Friday prayer meeting in Tehran that the nuclear issue should be settled by negotiations "conducted in a rational atmosphere".

Mr Atrianfar said the economy was the battleground on which Iran's political future would be decided.

The president has faced mounting criticism in recent weeks over high unemployment, especially among younger people, rising inflation and escalating housing costs.

Significantly, for a major oil producer, heavily subsidised petrol prices are due to rise next month, hitting poorer people hardest in a country with poor or non-existent public transport.

"They are playing with fire. Nobody wants to take responsibility for this. It's going to blow up in their faces," said Hussein Dirbaz, a resident of Narmak, the Tehran suburb where Mr Ahmadinejad was brought up.

In an unusual intervention, Grand Ayatollah Yusef Sa'anei, one of Iran's most respected Islamic scholars, has attacked Mr Ahmadinejad's government for failing to tackle social ills such as youth unemployment, drug addiction, and gender inequality.

In a rare interview with a western newspaper at his office in the holy city of Qom, Mr Sa'anei said: "The government should be at the service of the people. But it is putting too much pressure on the people.

"It bans newspapers, sends people to jail, segregates boys and the girls at the universities, makes noise about hijab."

A senior government official said the rising tide of criticism directed at Mr Ahmadinejad was unwarranted. "People say we don't care but that's not true. We've created more credit, more jobs.

"It's too soon to say [Ahmadinejad] has failed. It's too soon to say the reformists will win."

Observers claim that a power struggle is inevitable.

"A very big battle is coming. It's unavoidable," a western diplomat said. "There's a widening gulf between the two sides. There are profound divisions about which way Iran should go. It's going to get very rough."

The looming power struggle could decide whether Iran continues on a path of confrontation with the west or comes in from the cold, the diplomat said.

Read the enitre article here. While this highlights the ongoing problems in Iran, even if this plan succeeds, it promises at most be a band-aid on corrupt and hemmoraging economic and political systems that are likely unchangable absent another revolution that sweeps the clerics from power. As it stands now, regardless of how much some may want to reform the government, true power is held by the Supreme Guide and a few other clerics who wield veto power over any reforms and who have direct control over the instruments of power. The good news is that such a revolution is conceivable.

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What Now Inside Khomeinist Iran?

Walid Phares, the Middle East scholar and terrorism expert, argued at the start of the UK-hostage crisis that the Mullah's purpose in taking the hostages was mostly aimed inward, at providing justification for a tightening of the screws on a restive population and also an attempt at reigniting revolutionary zeal. See here and here. That assessment is borne out by Iranian author Amir Taheri, who gives us a view of the crackdown that is going on today in the wake of the hostage crisis.

. . . The crackdown is beginning to gather pace. Several publications critical of government have been shut down, and numerous officials regarded as "not revolutionary enough" elbowed out, especially in the provinces. And now the regime seems to be setting the stage for show trials that recall the worst days of Stalinism in the Soviet Union.

Last month, a member of the Majlis, the regime's ersatz parliament, was sent to prison for six years on trumped-up charges. The real "crime" of Salaheddin Ala'i: He had criticized the killing of dissidents in Iran's Kurdistan province.

Next week, it will be the turn of former Deputy Interior Minister Mostafa Tajzadeh, who'll stand trial on charges of undermining the security of the Khomeinist state.

Tajzadeh is one of the establishment's most interesting figures. A man with impeccable revolutionary credentials, he has always insisted that the regime cannot ensure its future by silencing or murdering critics.
The next on the block is expected to be Muhammad Reza Khatami - a brother of former President Muhammad Khatami - who also has an impressive revolutionary resume.

In 1979, he was one of the two dozen or so "students" who raided the United States' Embassy in Tehran and seized its diplomats hostage. Later, he built a career in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and solidified his revolutionary credentials by marrying a granddaughter of Ruhallah Khomeini, the ayatollah who created the Islamic Republic. During his brother's presidency, Muhammad Reza acted as deputy speaker of the Majlis.

Yet, he too, is targeted by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's new radical administration - charged with "activities that undermine the Islamic system."

Ahmadinejad believes that people like these three represent dangers for the system - if only because they insist that the authorities should obey the laws set by their own regime. In his view, a revolutionary regime, because it stands outside the normal framework of history, simply cannot be bound by any law.

According to dissident sources in Tehran, the regime's security apparatus is preparing show trials for scores of others. The chief targets: thousands of middle-class elements who joined the Khomeinist revolution because of a misunderstanding. Ahmadinejad calls them "the half-pregnant ones" - people who dream of being revolutionaries but also crave for a comfortable, Western-style bourgeois life.

Ahmadinejad's supporters speak of a "third revolution" - which, in practice, would amount to a purge of dissidents within the establishment.

Many actual or would-be dissidents have already left Iran for what they hope will be temporary exile in Europe or America. They include a dozen former Cabinet ministers and hundreds of lesser functionaries and apologists. If the looming crackdown gathers pace, thousands more may join them.

To prepare the ground for his "third revolution," Ahmadinejad has worked on three schemes.

* First, he has radicalized political discourse.

Under his two predecessors, Presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Muhammad Khatami, the regime had gradually changed its vocabulary by abandoning the revolutionary terminology and borrowing terms of ordinary politics.

Those two mullah-presidents spoke of economic development, civil society and a dialogue of civilizations. They also allowed some space for non-revolutionary (though not overtly counter-revolutionary) expression in such fields as art, cinema and literature.

. . . * Second, Ahmadinejad aims to link any criticism of the system with foreign powers.

In the decisions to close newspapers or put "khodi" figures on trial, the authorities drop hints about illicit relations with "foreign enemies of Islam." This amounts to a return to classical revolutionary lore in which anyone who criticizes the regime must be an agent of a foreign enemy.

* Ahmadinejad's third and perhaps most important scheme is to revive the regime's pretension of sacredness. He claims to receive periodic instructions from the Hidden Imam - a Mahdi-figure who, according to Shiite lore, went into hiding in 940 A.D. and will someday return to preside over the end of the world. He has thus restored the concept of the Hidden Imam to a central position within the Khomeinist doctrine.

The concept was pure fiction from the start, and most leaders of the Islamic Republic realized that retaining it posed insurmountable theo-political problems. This is why the Hidden Imam was given a back seat under Rafsanjani and Khatami, although both are Shiite clerics.

By restoring the Hidden Imam, Ahmadinejad makes it impossible for anyone to claim that Shiism, let alone Islam, admits of a range of interpretations. In this version of the Khomeinist doctrine, Islam is equated with Shiism, Shiism with the Hidden Imam - and the Hidden Imam with the Khomeinist regime.

THE "half pregnant" had hoped that "Supreme Guide" Ali Khamenehi might, would, at some point, restrain Ahmadinejad. Earlier this month, however, Khamenehi, in his Iranian New Year message, paid glowing tribute to Ahmadinejad, and endorsed his strategy.

The "half-pregnant" are now forced to choose between becoming full-blown revolutionaries - or joining the counter-revolution.

Read the entire article here. There has also been a return to public punishents under Sharia law:

The reformist website Rooz reported on April 5, 2007 that the Friday prayer leader of Shiraz, a city in the heart of Iran, had called for more public punishments, as prescribed by "hodud," Islamic penal law.

After a convicted thief’s hand was amputated in public in Kermanshah, Ayatollah Mohiyeddin Shirazi, an appointee of the supreme leader of Iran, criticized the halting of public punishments, and added, "Those who say that practices like amputating hands belong to the past are themselves part of the past." He also claimed that imprisonment had no effect "on educating criminals and reducing crime."

At a meeting with judges from Fars province, Shirazi argued that public punishments are more effective that imprisonment: "Prison and imprisoning individuals do not have an effect on educating criminals and reducing crime. They also add to corruption." He also called for using criminals convicted for drug-related charges as forced labor.

Kermanshah judiciary head Allahyar Malekshahi promised more amputations in the future and said that citizens had requested the public amputation.

Contine reading here. (h/t LGF)

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The Hostage Crisis Ends . . . So Where Are We?

The hostage crisis has come to a surpassingly anti-climatic end. We were treated to the sickening spectacle of a smiling Ahmedinejad making a “gift” to the UK of the hostages “for Easter.” Does anyone believe that was Iran's true motivation? So where does this leave all the players in the Iran UK-Hostage Kabuki dance?

Iran –

1. They did themselves no favors by this act of hostage taking. They let the hostages go after twelve days for the same reason they apparently took them – i.e., no clearly discernable logical reason. Most of the world will likely look on this rouge action by Iran – one which fits right in with their historical pattern of such actions – and have to wonder if the U.S. is not right, that Iran can under no circumstances be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Update: Walid Phares has his own analysis up of the detailed logic of the mullahs. See here. As does Victor David Hanson. See here.

2. A few, such as the hard left in Britain and our own hard left appearing in the New York Times, argue that Ahmedinejad’s agreement to end this charade of Iran’s own making demonstrates that Iran is amenable to diplomacy. They reason that we should forgo the military option against Iran over the nuclear issue, withdraw our carriers from the Gulf, and, darn’it, just start acting nicer. I kid you not. See this NYT editorial and this one from the UK’s Guardian. They could have been written Ahmedinejad himself. Such a position defies belief. It ignores Iran’s rouge nature in causing this hostage crisis, their incredibly bloody history in much of the death and destruction occurring to this day in the Middle East, and Iran's history of both duplicity and failure to engage in any diplomacy over its nuclear program. The words craven, contemptible, and out of touch with any semblance of reality are just a few of the descriptive terms appropriate for that crowd.

3. This event clarifies, as well as any, Iran’s power structure when it comes to foreign policy and the acts of the IRGC. Ahmedinejad is a mouthpiece, nothing more. The person calling the shots is the Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei and his band of mad mullahs. It is quite interesting that Ahmedinejad was effectively muzzled by the mullahs throughout this whole event, until he was allowed before the camera's at the end to announce Iran's "grand gesture" of "good will."

4. Iran took this action likely in an attempt to rally support for their cause at home and abroad. They found neither. As the WP explained:

. . . Iran is also likely to pay a long-term price for the detention drama, again appearing to undertake rogue actions in violation of international law, experts and officials said. In the end, Iran recognized that the crisis was beginning to exact a cost, as it came under pressure even from allies and other Islamic countries, officials and experts said. Even Syria urged Iran to release the Britons, Syrian and U.S. sources said.

"They are so consumed with short-term issues -- how to undermine the West and how to gain leverage -- at the expense of long-term strategy. They have undermined themselves," said Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "They're playing the immediate moves of checkers and not the long-term strategy of a chess game. In the long term, it undermines their ability to attract foreign investment and have good relations" with the outside world.

Tehran was also unable to rally significant public support for another long-term showdown like the 1979-1981 hostage ordeal involving 52 American diplomats, experts added. "There was no nationalist bounce out of this," said Patrick Clawson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "All the usual people you'd expect to be frothing at the mouth simply weren't."

5. The USS Nimitz, a third U.S. Carrier Group, is enroute to the Persian Gulf at this moment. I am waiting to see if it acts as a replacement for one of the two carriers already in place, or adds another to their number. In any event, I think Iran made a tactical error with this one. Overall, the likelihood that Iran will face a military strike on its nuclear facilities and other strikes aimed at its economic infrastructure went up palpably with this hostage taking.

The EU –

The EU established their bona fides as worse then utterly useless by refusing to help one of their own members against a regime that ultimately threatens every one of the EU members themselves. See here. Also see Krauthammer today here. The EU holds the key to shutting down Iran, stopping their nuclear program in its tracks. And we hold the key to making the EU do that. I suggest we all start a campaign to convince the Republicans to dust off the Iran Freedom Support Act and see if we can’t sanction every EU and US foreign subsidiary doing business in Iran today. It would take political courage – something that seems in short supply these days beyond Bush and Lieberman – but it is the next logical step.

Britain

1. The Brit's are more then a little upset. This is a people who learn about Nelson and Trafalgar while still suckling at the tit, and they remember with pride Britain’s travelling half way around the world to spank Argentina when they tried to seize the Falklands. The majority, judging from the news coverage, are not in a mood to play games with Iran again. They are asking all of the right questions (See Updates here). Iran will never get another free shot at British soldiers, sailors or marines again.

2. What this means for Britain’s long term deployment in Basra, Iraq is an open question. Even as they draw down, it appears that Iran is picking up the pace of its actions in Basra. I do hope this gives the Brits the kick in the ass they need to become as deadly efficient in clearing out Basra of the mullah’s infestation as I know that they can be.

Overall:

The US needs to continue doing what it is doing in terms of targeting Iranians inside Iraq as well as seeking regime change inside Iran and hurting the mullahs everywhere else that they are weak. If anything, this event shows that Iran is feeling the heat -- which usually is a good sign that it would be appropriate to turn the heat up a lot more in the coming weeks.

Let's leave the final words to Amir Taheri, the Iranian author speaking in the UK's Times today:

The seizure of the British naval personnel is the latest episode in a low-intensity war that the Islamic Republic has waged against the West for almost three decades. In this war, Iran has killed hundreds of Western, especially American and French troops, in suicide attacks in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. More recently, its agents have killed at least 200 American troops and an unknown number of British soldiers in Iraq. Its influence against Nato in Afghanistan, against President Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan and against Lebanon and Israel, through Hezbollah and Hamas, are well known.

So far, the West’s response has been timid and occasional. The mullahs play a long-term game, acting as carpet-weavers, knotting one mischief at time, day in and day out. They know that their fragile regime, hated by a majority of Iranians, would not survive a full-scale clash with the West. This is why they deal their poison in small but steady doses, enough to weaken the foe but not too much to mobilise Western opinion in favour of full confrontation.

The debate on what to do about the mullahs hits a deadend because it is limited to two options: regime change or surrender. Those who blame the West for the world’s evils urge surrender, in atonement of sins supposedly committed against Iran over centuries. They hope that once the mullahs are given everything, they would start behaving reasonably. This argument ignores the fact that the Khomeinist regime’s political DNA would not allow it to act reasonably. A scorpion does not sting because it wants to misbehave but because it is programmed to do so.

When it comes to the regime-change option, the usual suspects who still cry for Saddam Hussein would be up in arms. President Ahmadinejad knows that no American or British leader can garner popular support for preemptive war against Iran.

The alternative, however, is not one of surrender or regime change. The Western democracies could give the Islamic republic a taste of its own medicine — and engage it in the kind of low-intensity warfare that Iran itself indulges in. The mischief must not be cost-free. It would be resisted though diplomatic and economic means as well as through support for the democratic and reformist forces inside Iran. Throughout history, adversaries end up by adopting aspects of each other’s strategy.

The Islamic Republic wants a Khomeinist Middle East. The “Infidel” want a democratic, pro-West Middle East. The two visions are incompatible. Eventually, one must win as the other loses. As the British celebrate the return of their hostages they would do well to decide which vision deserves support.

Read the entire article here.

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U(K)tter Bull – Answering the Independent’s Claim that the U.S. is to Blame for the UK’s Hostage Crisis

The article “The Botched U.S. Raid That Led to the Hostage Crisis,” appearing in the British newspaper, The Independent, is a just a horrid hit piece. It's rank speculation masquerading as fact with a twist of moral equivalence that turns reality on its head. In the scenario posited by the Independent, hostage taking Iran is simply an innocent victim who has struck back only after unreasonable provocation by a bellicose and reckless U.S. It’s dangerous and utter nonsense.

The Independent claims that Iran’s kidnapping of 15 sailors and marines was a response to an unjustified U.S. provocation - a “botched” raid it claims was aimed at securing two high ranking Iranians, the head of intelligence for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) and the deputy head of Iran’s National Security Council. The Independent tells us that these officials were openly in Iraq for meetings with Kurdish leaders on “bilateral security issues.”

As the Independent describes it, the alleged U.S. attempt to secure these two men has “provoked a dangerous escalation.” Moreover, the Independent asserts that the raid was unjustified, describing it as the moral equivalent of “Iran . . . kidnap[ing] the heads of the CIA and MI6 while they were on an official visit to a country neighboring Iran, such as Pakistan or Afghanistan.” The raid ultimately netted five people the Independent describes as “junior liaison agents,” but not the two senior Iranian officials supposedly targeted.

The premise that Iran is an innocent victim that the U.S. should be leaving Iran alone is ridiculous. The Independent is either wholly ignoring the larger picture surrounding Iranian actions, or they have they been asleep for a few years and need to catch up on current events. There is precious little of anything innocent about Iranian involvement in Iraq. Nor is there anything innocent about Iran’s surge towards acquiring nuclear weapons. By ignoring these, the Independent distorts reality and engages in a suicidal game of moral equivalence.

As to Iran’s involvement in Iraq, there is no question of the theocracy’s complicity in the death and mayhem going on inside the country. For example, see here and here. And that mayhem is not just aimed at Americans and Sunnis – and Shias for that matter, it’s taking the lives of British soldiers in Basra also. See here.

Such acts are a provocation to the US and UK -- a real one, involving blood and brain matter splattering across streets, limbs lost, and hearts taking their final beat. In various forms, it has been going on since 2003. And the instruments of that bloodshed are the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Quds Force operating inside Iraq. Such provocation demands an adequate response. It justifies not only covert action against Iranian interests, but also overt actions if the U.S. or U.K. were inclined to take it.

Two, there is nothing innocent about Iran and the pending nuclear crisis they are imposing on the world. How dangerous is a nuclear armed Iranian theocracy? No less then the preeminent scholar of Middle Eastern history and culture, Bernard Lewis, spoke to the world on this issue some months ago:

A passage from the Ayatollah Khomeini, quoted in an 11th-grade Iranian schoolbook, is revealing. "I am decisively announcing to the whole world that if the world-devourers [i.e., the infidel powers] wish to stand against our religion, we will stand against their whole world and will not cease until the annihilation of all them. Either we all become free, or we will go to the greater freedom which is martyrdom. Either we shake one another's hands in joy at the victory of Islam in the world, or all of us will turn to eternal life and martyrdom. In both cases, victory and success are ours."

In this context, mutual assured destruction, the deterrent that worked so well during the Cold War, would have no meaning. At the end of time, there will be general destruction anyway. What will matter will be the final destination of the dead--hell for the infidels, and heaven for the believers. For people with this mindset, MAD is not a constraint; it is an inducement.

See here. Then today there was this assessment from the brilliant scholar, Thomas Sowell:

Once Iran has nuclear weapons, that will be an irreversible change that will mark a defining moment in the history of the United States and of Western civilization, which will forever after live at the mercy of hate-filled suicidal fanatics and sadists.

See here. The threat posed by a nuclear armed Khomeinist theocracy is palpable and existential. George Bush has promised to meet it. He has flatly stated that he will not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. I trust he has said what he means. Indeed, even Presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have made noises indicating that they would take military action to stop Iran from attaining nuclear weapons.

Everyday, we inch closer to open warfare with Iran as they refuse to give up their quest for a nuclear weapon. Iran has not responded to years of European diplomacy. Nor has the theocracy responded to sanctions. Quite the opposite, they have increased the speed of their nuclear program. If Iran is going to be made to stop, the mullahs must understand the price to be paid to continue on their current path will be be real and it will be severe.

Doing absolutely nothing beyond diplomacy and tepid sanctions leaves Iran’s theocrats with a belief that the West is a eunuch. And indeed, as any student of the Iranian Revolution knows, that is a cherished belief among the mullahs. One of Ayatollah Khomeni’s favored expressions was that the West “can’t do a damned thing.” Unfortunately for the world, Jimmy Carter was President when Khoemeni popularized that phrase. Interestingly, the U.S. hostages were released the day Ronald Regan was inaugurated as President. I have no doubt that there were limits to how far Khomeini was willing to test his thesis – and Regan’s inauguration as President marked one of those clear limits.

The only way we will stop Iran’s nuclear program short of open war is to make Iran’s mullahs understand that we are able and willing to engage Iran. As long as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei feels safe and secure, Iran will not turn from its path of murderous complicity in Iraq and the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Thus, unless we want open war in the very near future, we have to aggressively engage Iran on the margins and make them feel the pain. Put another way, in the larger context that takes into account Iranian direct support for warfare targeting the US and Britain inside Iraq, as well as the Iranian drive for nuclear weapons, the U.S. raids on Iranian high value targets are not only wholly warranted, they are a necessity born of self-defense.

But all of that is mere context, for having now justified covert actions against Iran, such as targeting their senior officials in Iraq, it matters not to the instant case as the Independent provides no reasonable proof that the "botched" raid happened as they allege. The sole proof the Independent offers to establish that U.S. troops were targeting the two senior Iranian official is a bald assertion by the Chief of Staff to the governor of Kurdistan Regional Government. It is more then curious that the Independent should fail to tell us how he acquired his knowledge or give us any other indicia of the reliability of his statement. Certainly the Independent would have included anything that might have buttressed his assertion. Since I seriously doubt the Kurdish staff official was included in the planning of the raid, we can safely assume that he is not stating first hand information. In other words, it is apparent that this “source” is speculating or repeating speculation as to the target of the U.S. raid in question.

Moreover, as a logical matter, I have a lot of trouble believing that the U.S. could have “botched” a raid targeting the two senior Iranian officials given the scenario painted by the Independent. The target location of the raid was in a secure area regularly trafficked by Kurds. The two Iranian officials were operating in the open. In such circumstance, it is more then difficult to believe that the U.S. would pull the trigger on a raid by its Special Forces when the alleged subjects of the assault were not present at the target location. Raids such as this are not spur of the moment operations. With the two officials making no attempt to conceal their presence, they would have been easy to track, and the raid would not have commenced until intelligence confirmed the location of the two men. In short, there is no alternative reason to support the Independent's claim that the raid was actually targeting the two senior Iranian officials.

Further, the Independent takes some cheap shots at the U.S. regarding the five Iranians seized during the raid, surmising that they were cleary inocent diplomatic staff:

US officials in Washington subsequently claimed that the five Iranian officials they did seize, who have not been seen since, were "suspected of being closely tied to activities targeting Iraq and coalition forces". This explanation never made much sense. No member of the US-led coalition has been killed in Arbil and there were no Sunni-Arab insurgents or Shia militiamen there.

Neither you, I, nor the author of this piece has any clue what intelligence the U.S. was operating on when it took these five Iranians into custody. But that does not stop the Independent. Let me ask, if you wished to set up a headquarters for a covert network, do you want it at a location crawling with US and British forces, or would you prefer an area that is easily accessible, in reasonable proximity, and with far less security roaming about? The Independent’s speculation based on just geographical location is nonsensical.

Next, the Independent speculates as to Ali Khamenei’s motivation in taking the 15 sailors and marines as hostages. The author gives not one shred of evidence for his assertion that the taking of the 15 hostages was a strike in retaliation for the “botched” raid. The fact that IRNA portrayed the U.S. raid as targeting the two senior officials tells us nothing. There is more then one reason to take the fifteen sailors and marines hostage that make more sense then simple revenge for a “botched” mission by the U.S.

One, the kidnapping fell on the eve of a Security Council vote to impose more sanctions on Iran for their failure to halt their nuclear program. That seems too fortuitous to be coincidental. Thus, it is conceivable that this kidnapping is meant to slow the pace of pressure being brought to bear on Iran over the nuclear program.

Two, given that the UK was targeted and not the US, it is quite possible that Iran is attempting to drive a wedge in the alliance between the US and the UK. If so, then the Independent is doing the work for Ahmedinejad and company by writing articles such as this one today, blaming the US for the kidnapping – not Iran.

Lastly, the Middle Eastern scholar and terrorism expert Walid Phares has written that the kidnapping is most likely a gambit by Khamenei to draw a limited military response, and that the kidnapping is directed squarely at quelling internal dissent in Iran that threatens the theocracy. See here.

I could go on here, but, what it boils down to that nothing in this article by the Independent blaming the US for the Iranian kidnapping withstands even minimal scrutiny. In sum, this is a hit piece that blames the U.S. for the an abominable act by the thuggish Iranian theocracy. And this is certainly not the mullahs first act of kidnapping. Actually, kidnapping is a well established part of Iranian foreign policy. Iran has been involved in kidnapping over 1,000 people since the mullahs came to power in 1979. But I digress.

Is the U.S. targeting Iranians in Iraq and elsewhere? I certainly hope so. Does that make the U.S. morally guilty for any Iranian retaliatory act? The answer is yes only if you are an apologist for Iran, or so steeped in the doctrine of moral equivalence that you cannot see a difference between Iran and the U.S. If so, please see the differences here. At any rate, I am not sure which of the two categories the Independent fits into, but it is at least one of them.

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Taheri on Iran's Act of War

Amir Taheri has an excellent article on Iran's kidnapping of the 15 British sailors and Marines. His point is that this was no simple act of border defense, irrespective of whether the Brits had strayed into Iranian territorial waters.

We may never know what actually happened. The area where the sailors were captured is at the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab, a border estuary that has caused two wars between Iran and Iraq since the 1970s. Iraq claims ownership of the entire estuary, while Iran wants it divided between the two neighbors. It is possible that the sailors thought they were in Iraqi waters while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard's Marines believed them to be on the Iranian side.

What is certain, however, is that the sailors would not have been captured without Tehran's approval at the highest level. The Brits based in Basra have often strayed into waters that Iran regards as its own; Iranians have also often passed into Iraqi waters.

In other words, these are almost daily incidents. The standard procedure is to warn the trespassers and guide them back to their own side of the water. If that procedure was abandoned this time, the reason must be someone's desire to provoke an incident.

If trespassing were the cause of the incident, one wonders why the Islamic Republic turns a blind eye to American vessels often straying into its so-called continental-shelf territorial waters. A casual boat ride in the Persian Gulf would offer the visitor countless examples of this on a daily basis.

It is possible that the mullahs don't yet wish to provoke a direct clash with the United States, and have used the incident with the Brits as a means of testing the waters. They may also hope that they could force London to press Washington to release the Revolutionary Guard commanders held in Baghdad in exchange for the British hostages.

The mullahs' move cannot be fortuitous: The Brits were captured on the eve of a new Security Council resolution, drafted by Britain, to impose harsher sanctions against the Islamic Republic.

It also came after months in which the Western powers have been exerting what is known as "proximity pressure" on the Khomeinist regime. A former deputy defense minister of the Islamic Republic, Gen. Ali-Reza Askari (Asgari), was kidnapped or defected and is presumed to be in the United States. Five senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including its head of special operations, Gen. Mohammed Jafar Sahraroudi, remain under lock and key after having been arrested by U.S. forces in Baghdad.

Tehran is full of rumors about supposed secret contacts established by the Americans with several senior political and military figures with a view toward a regime change. The contacts supposedly include a former prime minister and a former defense minister.

Not surprisingly, the "Supreme Guide" Ali Khamenei appears to have concluded that the best defense is to go on the offensive. In a tough speech last week, Khamenei in effect put the Islamic Republic on a war footing. He endorsed President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's "no compromise" position on the nuclear issue and threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Ever since it erupted on the scene, the Khomeinist revolution has always accompanied a hardening of its position by seizing hostages. In November 1979, just eight months after seizing power, the Khomeinist regime endorsed the seizure of American diplomats as hostages in Tehran.

During the following quarter-century, the Islamic Republic was involved in seizing more than 1,000 hostages from more than 30 countries in Iran or through its Hezbollah agents in Lebanon. These included a French ambassador to Tehran, Guy Georgy, two German bankers and eight American and French journalists - plus dozens of businessmen, priests and tourists from countries as far apart as South Korea and Italy. Right now, in addition to the 15 Brits, the Islamic Republic is holding a German hostage.

Western apologists for the Khomeinist regime have already started blaming the United States for having made the mullahs nervous. The argument of the apologists is simple: Don't do anything that makes the mullahs unhappy, or else they will do more mischief.

The truth, however, is that making the mullahs nervous may be the only way of persuading them to end their defiance of the United Nations and stop trying to export Khomeinism to neighboring countries.

Read the entire article here. Without going into extensive detail, I can attest, from my one year plus spent on the DMZ in Korea, of the accuracy of Taheri's description of how minor border are regularly treated between two countries without a clear border line and who are not in open hostilities.

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Iran Marching Towards War

From the Washington Times today:

The Iranian government will charge 15 captured British service members with "illegal entrance into Iranian waters," Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said yesterday, raising the stakes in his country's confrontation with an outraged British government.

Mr. Mottaki told reporters in New York that the matter had already been referred to the Iranian legal system and that the 14 men and one woman, who were captured in the Persian Gulf on Friday, would stand trial.

. . . Mr. Blair said on the sidelines of a European summit. "But this is a very serious situation."

He added: "I hope that this can be resolved over the next few days, but the quicker it is resolved, the easier it will be for all of us. But [the Iranians] should not be under any doubt at all about how seriously we regard this act, which was unjustified and wrong."

Read the story here.

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Iranian Acts of War

Iran has crossed into Iraqi territory, taken fifteen British sailors and marines hostage, (see here) and is threatening them with death unless five senior members of the IRGC / Quds Force, all either captured in Iraq or defectors to the U.S., are returned to Iran. See here. That is an act of war by any measure, and unless the Brits are returned immediately, it needs to be treated as such. Further, how the British leadership allowed their capture without firing a shot is unforgivable.

This is not the first such act by Iran who, in 2004, traversed into Iraqi waters and captured several British sailors and marines, claiming that they had crossed into Iranian waters. The Brits did not fight their capture and were taken into Iranian custody. Iran kept the troops for several days, threatened to put them on trial, put them on Iranian television (a violation of international law the lefties somehow missed crying about), and forced a “confession” from the sailors that they were in Iranian waters when captured. Iran released the troops three days later. Britain and the US treated this just as a misunderstanding. There is no misunderstanding this time.

Once again, this time on March 23, Iran traversed into Iraqi waters, this time capturing 15 British naval and marine personnel. They did so under the nose of the British Frigate, HMS Cornwall . It is an atrocity that the Brits allowed this to happen again without firing a shot. I know that the British troops are every bit as brave and proud as any American soldier. The British leadership, however, may be a different story. How they could allow this to happen a second time, and directly under the nose of superior British firepower is unforgivable. If the British leadership lack the backbone to defend their troops against Iranian aggression, they should pull back from the border.

Two, indications are that the Iranians are not going to return the Brits this time. See here. They are treating the detainees as hostages, and are threatening them with death for the crime of espionage. Why the difference this time. Its because the United States has decided to engage Iran in the covert war that Iran has been waging against the U.S. since 1979. Not only is the U.S. engaging, they are doing so effectively, and the Iranians are squealing like stuck pigs. See here and here. Over the past few months, by a combination of defections and covert action, we have taken at least five major targets in the command structure of the IRGC / Quds Force. (See update below - there are now 300 being held by U.S. forces) By Iranian accounts, the taking of the 15 Brits by Iran was approved by Iran’s plenary theocrat, Ayatollah Khameini in retaliaton. See here.

Under no circumstance can or should we play Iran’s game. To do so will only embolden them further. If Iran wants open warfare with the U.S. and Britain, they need only push this act a little further. Failure to return these British troops or placing them on trial have to be considered as acts of war and a stepped progression of military responses must ensue. The very first step should be to make this an international cause celebre, with Iran framed as a pariah – and the ramifications of their act spelled out clearly. This should not be treated as a simple misunderstanding at the diplomatic level.

Upadate: Walid Phares disects the Iranian thinking here, cautioning against any overt military acts against Iran because of the growing liklihood of revolt in Iran.

Update: From Pajamas Media:

American forces in Iraq now hold some 300 prisoners tied to Iran’s intelligence agencies, Pajamas Media learned from both diplomatic and military sources.

This is believed, by both sources, to be a record number of prisoners tied to Iran. Virtually all were captured in the past two months.

. . . The roughly 300 prisoners held in Iraq—the number grows frequently—are either Iranian nationals or Shiites recruited from neighboring countries that are employed one of its almost two dozen intelligence or paramilitary services. The record haul of Iran-linked prisoners may not be a sign of Iran’s increasing involvement in Iraq. The Islamic Republic’s participation in the Iraq war, which includes funding, arming and training both Shiite and Sunni militias, has been known to be significant for some time. More likely, the large number of Iran-linked prisoners reflects a change in tactics following the arrival of Multinational Force Iraq commander Army Gen. David H. Petraeus.

Previously, Iranians and other foreigners could not be picked up without a provable connection to terrorism. Now, American and allied forces are encouraged to seize militants based on a reasonable suspicion of involvement in insurgent attacks. This is consistent with Iraqi law. The number of bombings associated with Iran-backed groups seems to be declining, although both sources cautioned it is too soon to be sure. The Pentagon received “considerable pressure” from officials in the State department and CIA to release some or all of the Iran-linked prisoners to facilitate discussions between Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Iranian officials.

Apparently, Gen. Petraeus sharply disagreed, saying that he intends to hold the prisoners “until they run out of information or we run out of food,” according to our sources who heard these remarks through channels. The two sources requested anonymity, citing the sensitivity of the intelligence and developing events with Iran.

More than a month ago, Pajamas Media exclusively reported that the firebrand cleric Moqtada al-Sadr had fled to Iran in the face of the surge and that his Mahdi Army was breaking into pieces. More recently, Pajamas Media reported that a number of Mahdi Army commanders were seeking to negotiate with American forces. Now, the Associated Press is reporting the same developments.

Update: The WSJ has a similar opinion article here.

Update: As to further acts of Iranian agression, there is a strong sense among the British that the Iranians are financing the bulk of terrorist acts occurring in Basara. See here.

A senior British Army officer says Iranian agents are paying local Iraqis as much as $A620 dollars a month to carry out attacks on coalition forces around the southern city of Basra.

In an interview with BBC radio from Iraq, Lieutenant Colonel Justin Maciejewski says contact with locals suggests the "vast majority" of violence against British troops stationed in the city comes from outside Iraq.

"We haven't found any smoking gun but certainly all the circumstantial evidence points to Iranian involvement in the bombings here in Basra, which is disrupting the city to a great extent," he said.

"Local sheikhs and tribal leaders here in Basra, who are desperate to prevent this violence escalating, are telling us that Iranian agents are paying up to $US500 a month for young Basrawi men to attack us.

"I have no direct proof that I can put my hand on but I have no reason to disbelieve what we have been told by locals here, who are desperate for this interference in their internal affairs to stop.

"They want to rebuild their city and make it a thriving city here in southern Iraq."

Lieutenant Colonel Maciejewski is the commanding officer at the British base at Basra Palace.

The officer's comments follow those by Prime Minister Tony Blair, who has on a number of occasions accused Tehran of supplying Iraqis opposed to the coalition presence with weapons.

"We have a lot of very modern and quite sophisticated weaponry being used against us, weaponry that could only really have been procured from a state," Lieutenant Colonel Maciejewski said.

"These are not old munitions from the Iran-Iraq war.

"They are much more modern, some of them produced in 2006, and the locals are telling us that these are coming in from Iran."

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