Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani versus Iran

I posted here on the significance of the formal change of loyalty of Iraq's largest Shia political party, SCIRI. This organization, created in Iran and sworn to fealty towards Iran's Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has now changed their name to the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and officially broken with Iran, pledging now to take their guidance from Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Sistani's philosophy of apolitical Shia'ism is directly at odds with that of Iran's theocracy. The Boston Globe today details the importance of Sistani, and why the Iranian government is afraid of him:

Iran's ruling clerics have long prided themselves on running the world's only Shi'ite Muslim state -- a state that imposes religion, dictating what imams can preach, what the media can report, and what people can wear.

So some Iranians are intrigued by the more freewheeling experiment in Shi'ite empowerment taking place across the border in Iraq, where -- Iraq's myriad problems aside -- imams can say whatever they want in political Friday sermons, newspapers and satellite channels regularly slam the government, and religious observance is respected and encouraged but not required.

In Tehran's storied central bazaar, an increasing number of merchants are sending their religious donations, a 20 percent tithe expected from all who can spare it, to Iraq's most senior Shi'ite cleric -- rather than to clerics closer to Iran's state power structure, said Jawad al-Ghaie, 48, a wholesaler of false eyelashes and nail extensions and a respected lay donor.

Speaking carefully to avoid directly challenging the Iranian government, he and several fellow merchants suggested that Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani holds more spiritual sway because of his lifelong commitment to quietism. That is the school of thought that says Shi'ite leaders should stay out of government, and Sistani has stuck to it despite the great temptation to wade into the chaos of Iraqi politics.

Haamed Hussein Warraqi, another merchant, contrasted the different ways in which Sistani and the Iranian religious authorities deal with overly exuberant revelers on Arbayeen, an important Shi'ite holiday. In Iran, he said, riot police line the streets to rein in men who cut their scalps with knives -- a show of mourning that the Iranian government and some religious scholars deem Islamically incorrect.

In contrast, "Sistani uses the authority of his word," said Warraqi, 27. "The domain of Sistani is in religion, and he is obeyed by the people. Here they want to rule according to politics. That's why they have to use the riot police."

"Any time religion is imposed by the government," Ghaie added, "there is a bad reaction."

. . . But ever since US-sponsored elections brought the Shi'ite majority to power, Iraq's imperfect liberation has quietly influenced the debate among religious Shi'ites about the role of religion in government .

After Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini founded a state that rests on his concept of velayat e faqi, or guardianship of the jurist. There are elections and parliamentary debates, but ultimate authority rests with a supreme leader who is appointed by a council of clerics.

Traditionally, Shi'ites have believed that clerics should stay out of politics until the return of the Mahdi, the last of the revered early Shi'ite imams, who disappeared in the ninth century. Shi'ites believe he went into hiding and will someday reveal himself.

Only he can establish a perfect Islamic state, according to traditional believers -- including some in the Tehran bazaar, whose influential religious merchant class backed the revolution but has since grown more skeptical of the ruling clerics.

"Only the Mahdi is the genuine leader," said Ghaie's brother Mohammad, 45, whose family, like many Iranian merchants, has lived in both Iran and Iraq over generations.

Expressing such opinions is dangerous: Several prominent religious scholars -- chief among them Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri -- are under house arrest or other official sanctions for opposing clerical rule or proposing limits on it.

The quietist philosophy suited disempowered Shi'ites, who through most of their history lived under Sunni powers. Shi'ites are a minority among Muslims and within all modern Middle Eastern states except Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain.

But now, in Iraq, Shi'ites are witnessing a new alternative: They can defend their rights at the ballot box, without establishing a religious state.

. . . "We believe that politics is separate from religion," said Iraq's ambassador to Iran, Mohammed Majid al-Sheikh. "Of course there are debates about this. If Iran wants to take on these debates, it will benefit. And I could say that the experiment of Iraq will ripple throughout the Middle East."

Iran has worked hard to influence Iraq. US officials have accused it of fomenting violence there. Analysts say Iran welcomes low-grade chaos in Iraq in part to prevent the emergence of a democratic Shi'ite alternative that could embolden Iranian reformists, while at the same time courting Shi'ite Iraqis by presenting itself as a stable and benign neighbor.

But influence is a two-way street, especially between two countries whose shrine cities and capitals have been tied by trade and pilgrimage for centuries. About 1,500 Iranians go to Iraq on pilgrimage every day, Sheikh said. The Ghaie brothers went recently and were impressed to see the parade of Iraqi politicians visiting Sistani's modest house in Najaf -- voluntarily -- for advice.

Last month, the Iranian press reported, Jalaluddin Taheri, a dissident cleric who resigned as Isfahan's Friday prayer leader in 2002 after criticizing the regime as corrupt and autocratic, went to Najaf to pay respects to Sistani.

The representative of Iraq's most pro-Iran political party, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, touted Iraq's freer system. . . .

Read the entire story here. It would seem that one goal of the war in Iraq - to put in place a democracy, even though imperfect and under seige from many forces, including Iran's theocracy - is having an impact. Do we really want to sacrifice Iraq's Shia's to Iran's theocracy?

(H/T Instapundit)

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A Significant Political Development in Iraq as the SCIRI Goes Local

There was a very positive political development Friday involving Iraq's largest Shia political party, the Supreme Counsel of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. The SCIRI was originally a resistance organization formed in the 1990's by Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al Hakim. Al Hakim had fled to Iran to escape a death sentence from Saddam Hussein. With the support of Iran's theocracy, al Hakim formed a political organization, the SCIRI, that pledged to take direction from the Supreme Giude of Iran. The organization also had a military wing, the Badr Brigade. Anyone viewing the situation in 2003 would likely conclude that SCIRI was an Iranian proxy along the lines of Hezbollah. Events since 2003 have proven otherwise.

SCIRI joined Iraq's political process following the 2003 invasion. While the Badr Brigade pledged to disarm, they did not do so. Nonetheless, SCIRI has not engaged in the extreme anti-American rhetoric of Iran's other best friend in Iraq, Sadr, nor have they engaged in any sort of major hostilities with coalition forces. Actually, to the contrary, they have assisted coalition forces in several notable instances, though the slate is not clean. The Badr Brigades have been accused of playing a significant role in reprisal attacks against Sunnis in the months following the bombing of the Golden Mosque. But, even if true, there is no evidence of any ongoing major role in the sectarian violence.

Politically, the SCIRI has proven far more pragmatic then its religious origins and relationship to Iran's brand of Khomeinist political Shia'ism would lead one to project. Indeed, in December, 2006, in order to stop the havoc caused by the ever increasing sectarian attacks being carried out by the Sadr militia, SCIRI reached across the aisle to Sunni and Kurdish legislators to discuss the possibility of forming a coalition government that would isolate Sadr and his 30 member bloc in Parliament. This may well have been a critical event in moving Prime Minister Maliki to break with Sadr and support the counterinsurgency effort that today sees Sadr hiding in Iran while the U.S. military and Iraqi forces occupy Sadr City.

Now the latest acts of SCIRI suggest a much cleaner break with the Iranian theocracy:

Iraq's biggest Shi'ite party on Saturday pledged its allegiance to the country's top Shi'ite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, in a move that would distance it from Shi'ite Iran where it was formed.

The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) said it had introduced significant policy changes and changed its name to the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) -- dropping the word "Revolution".

Party officials told Reuters on Friday that the changes were aimed at giving the party more of an Iraqi flavor and to reflect the changing situation in the country since the U.S.-led invasion toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003.

They said the party had been close to Sistani for some time, but a two-day conference on Baghdad that ended on Friday had formalized relations with the influential cleric.

"We cherish the great role played by the religious establishment headed by Grand Ayatollah Sayed Ali al-Sistani ... in preserving the unity of Iraq and the blood of Iraqis and in helping them building a political system based on the constitution and law," said Rida Jawad al-Takki, a senior group member, who read out the party's decisions to reporters.

The party pledged to follow the guidance of the Shi'ite establishment, he said.

Sistani, a reclusive figure who lives in the Iraqi holy Shi'ite city of Najaf, is the spiritual leader of Iraq's majority Shi'ites. He rarely makes public statements but his utterances are closely monitored by his followers.

Officials said the party, which was formed in Iran in the 1980s to oppose Saddam, had previously taken its guidance from the religious establishment of Welayat al Faqih, led by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran.

They said the party had been close to Sistani for some time, but a two-day conference on Baghdad that ended on Friday had formalized relations with the influential cleric.

"We cherish the great role played by the religious establishment headed by Grand Ayatollah Sayed Ali al-Sistani ... in preserving the unity of Iraq and the blood of Iraqis and in helping them building a political system based on the constitution and law," said Rida Jawad al-Takki, a senior group member, who read out the party's decisions to reporters.

The party pledged to follow the guidance of the Shi'ite establishment, he said.

Sistani, a reclusive figure who lives in the Iraqi holy Shi'ite city of Najaf, is the spiritual leader of Iraq's majority Shi'ites. He rarely makes public statements but his utterances are closely monitored by his followers.

Officials said the party, which was formed in Iran in the 1980s to oppose Saddam, had previously taken its guidance from the religious establishment of Welayat al Faqih, led by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran. . . .

Read the entire story here. This is all very good news. Grand Ayatollah Sistani, himself an Iranian, is at odds with Iran's theocracy. He subscribes to the traditional principles of apolitical Shia'ism, which Khomeini shredded when he established a clerical regime in Iran following the 1979 revolution. Indeed, according to the Middle East Institute, Sistani's belief in non-political Shia'sm present "a serious threat to Iran’s Islamic Republic." Thus, for example, Sistani has refused to involve himself in criticizing or negating political proposals for de-baathification that would open the way for Sunnis to retake positions in government. The SIIC formal turn towards Sistani and break with Iran's theocracy is very significant. On its face, this move by 'SIIC' seems a very positive political development indeed.

(H/T Dinah Lord)

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More Turmoil in Iran's Theocracy

There is more turmoil and political machinations taking place in Iran's theocracy as a plan is afoot to unseat the tough talking but largely ineffectual Ahmedinejad from power.

A grand coalition of anti-government forces is planning a second Iranian revolution via the ballot box to deny President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad another term in office and break the grip of what they call the "militia state" on public life and personal freedom.

Encouraged by recent successes in local elections, opposition factions, democracy activists, and pro-reform clerics say they will bring together progressive parties loyal to former president Mohammad Khatami with so-called pragmatic conservatives led by Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani.

The alliance aims to exploit the president's deepening unpopularity, borne of high unemployment, rising inflation and a looming crisis over petrol prices and possible rationing to win control of the Majlis in general elections which are due within 10 months.

Parliament last week voted to curtail Mr Ahmadinejad's term by holding presidential and parliamentary elections simultaneously next year.

Though the move is likely to be vetoed by the hardline Guardian Council, it served notice of mounting disaffection in parliament.

But opposition spokesmen say their broader objective is to bring down the fundamentalist regime by democratic means, transform Iran into a "normal country", and obviate the need for any military or other US and western intervention. Rightwing political and religious forces, divided and dismayed by Mr Ahmadinejad's much-criticised performance, are already mobilising to meet the threat.

The movement amounts to the clearest sign yet within Iran that the country is by no means unified behind a president who has led it into confrontation with the west over the nuclear issue, while presiding over economic decline at home.

"The past two years have been a very bitter time for Iran," said Mohammad Atrianfar, a leading opposition figure with ties to Mr Rafsanjani, the former president now emerging as a likely future kingmaker in Iran.

"Ahmadinejad has done everything upside down - politics, economy, foreign policy - putting all our achievements at risk. He has done a lot of damage at home and abroad."

Mr Atrianfar said that a majority in the Majlis was now critical of the president and would certainly impeach him but for the support he enjoyed from the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

According to Ali Alavi of Siyasat-e Ruz newspaper, some 150 political activists, governors-general, former administration officials and dissident MPs drew up a coalition "victory strategy" at a secretive conference last month presided over by Mr Khatami.

The strategy envisaged "aggravation of the differences among the fundamentalists" and "constant criticism of Ahmadinejad" by "presenting a dark image of the country's affairs," Mr Alavi said.

Opposition sources said that a future reformist-pragmatist government would continue to maintain Iran's claim to nuclear energy and other "national rights" but would seek to settle disputes through talks.

Iran wanted a "normal" relationship with the rest of the world based on mutual respect, the opposition sources said.

In an oblique swipe at Mr Ahmadinejad, Mr Rafsanjani told the weekly Friday prayer meeting in Tehran that the nuclear issue should be settled by negotiations "conducted in a rational atmosphere".

Mr Atrianfar said the economy was the battleground on which Iran's political future would be decided.

The president has faced mounting criticism in recent weeks over high unemployment, especially among younger people, rising inflation and escalating housing costs.

Significantly, for a major oil producer, heavily subsidised petrol prices are due to rise next month, hitting poorer people hardest in a country with poor or non-existent public transport.

"They are playing with fire. Nobody wants to take responsibility for this. It's going to blow up in their faces," said Hussein Dirbaz, a resident of Narmak, the Tehran suburb where Mr Ahmadinejad was brought up.

In an unusual intervention, Grand Ayatollah Yusef Sa'anei, one of Iran's most respected Islamic scholars, has attacked Mr Ahmadinejad's government for failing to tackle social ills such as youth unemployment, drug addiction, and gender inequality.

In a rare interview with a western newspaper at his office in the holy city of Qom, Mr Sa'anei said: "The government should be at the service of the people. But it is putting too much pressure on the people.

"It bans newspapers, sends people to jail, segregates boys and the girls at the universities, makes noise about hijab."

A senior government official said the rising tide of criticism directed at Mr Ahmadinejad was unwarranted. "People say we don't care but that's not true. We've created more credit, more jobs.

"It's too soon to say [Ahmadinejad] has failed. It's too soon to say the reformists will win."

Observers claim that a power struggle is inevitable.

"A very big battle is coming. It's unavoidable," a western diplomat said. "There's a widening gulf between the two sides. There are profound divisions about which way Iran should go. It's going to get very rough."

The looming power struggle could decide whether Iran continues on a path of confrontation with the west or comes in from the cold, the diplomat said.

Read the enitre article here. While this highlights the ongoing problems in Iran, even if this plan succeeds, it promises at most be a band-aid on corrupt and hemmoraging economic and political systems that are likely unchangable absent another revolution that sweeps the clerics from power. As it stands now, regardless of how much some may want to reform the government, true power is held by the Supreme Guide and a few other clerics who wield veto power over any reforms and who have direct control over the instruments of power. The good news is that such a revolution is conceivable.

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So When Do The Gloves Finally Come Off?

According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Corps General Peter Pace, Iran is providing arms and EFP's not only to the Shia militants, but also to Sunni militants in Iraq, as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan.

"We surmise from that, one of two things: Either the leadership of the country knows what their armed forces are doing, or they don't know. In either case, that's a problem," Gen. Pace said.

There are also reports Iran is stepping up support for Iraqi insurgents. Army Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of Multinational Corps-Iraq, told reporters Friday there are new signs that Iran is "not only providing support to Shia groups, but also Sunni insurgent groups."

"We don't have any specific proof of that yet, but there's been some indications that that could in fact be the case," he said.

Asked why the Iranians would be supporting Sunnis, when in the past their support was primarily for Shi'ites, Gen. Odierno said: "I think it's mainly because they want to continue to create chaos in Iraq. They do not want this government potentially to succeed."

Iran also is trying to "try to tie down coalition forces here," Gen. Odierno said.

Read the entire article here. General Pace, when asked how the U.S. military will "respond to the Iranian backing for insurgents," stated "We will continue to be very aggressive . . . inside of Iraq and inside of Afghanistan against any elements that are posing a threat to our own forces." At this point, that is not sufficient.

One, the question of whether the "leadership" of Iran knows what its military is doing is a canard. This is a deliberate act for which the mullah's are responsible. Moreover, given the command structure of Iran - the IRGC reports directely to the Supreme Guide - it cannot be assumed that the ongoing provision of weapons and, in fact, the training of militants, are simply rogue acts. Two, while we are taking aggressive actions against the Iranians inside Iraq - at this point we hold some 300 Iranians and are targeting any in Iraq we deem connected to terrorism - such actions are obviously not yet sufficient to deter Iran from involving themselves to an even greater extent in a proxy war against us in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The most appropriate response would be, if we can identify and verify the Iranian base at which the IRGC are training the Iraqi militants, then destroy it. Is that an act of war? Of course. But so is what the Iranians are doing. Ahmedinejad will rant and rave - but in the lexicon of the military, he has an alligator mouth and a tweety bird ass. It will give the mad mullahs a dose of reality and a very stark choice - particularly with two aircraft carriers in the gulf and a third enroute.

The mullahs must be made to grasp the seriousness of the game they are playing -- a game in which they seem to think that they hold the upper hand. Indeed, for thirty years Iran has not paid any price for the murder and mayhem of this ilk that they have caused, arming and acting through proxies, causing untold slaughter. They must be disabused of the belief that the U.S. will continue to tolerate it, and a line in the sand must be drawn. Allowing this to continue is ridiculous, and it is our soldiers and Britain's soldiers on the ground who are paying the price. The gloves must come off.

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The Hostage Crisis Ends . . . So Where Are We?

The hostage crisis has come to a surpassingly anti-climatic end. We were treated to the sickening spectacle of a smiling Ahmedinejad making a “gift” to the UK of the hostages “for Easter.” Does anyone believe that was Iran's true motivation? So where does this leave all the players in the Iran UK-Hostage Kabuki dance?

Iran –

1. They did themselves no favors by this act of hostage taking. They let the hostages go after twelve days for the same reason they apparently took them – i.e., no clearly discernable logical reason. Most of the world will likely look on this rouge action by Iran – one which fits right in with their historical pattern of such actions – and have to wonder if the U.S. is not right, that Iran can under no circumstances be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Update: Walid Phares has his own analysis up of the detailed logic of the mullahs. See here. As does Victor David Hanson. See here.

2. A few, such as the hard left in Britain and our own hard left appearing in the New York Times, argue that Ahmedinejad’s agreement to end this charade of Iran’s own making demonstrates that Iran is amenable to diplomacy. They reason that we should forgo the military option against Iran over the nuclear issue, withdraw our carriers from the Gulf, and, darn’it, just start acting nicer. I kid you not. See this NYT editorial and this one from the UK’s Guardian. They could have been written Ahmedinejad himself. Such a position defies belief. It ignores Iran’s rouge nature in causing this hostage crisis, their incredibly bloody history in much of the death and destruction occurring to this day in the Middle East, and Iran's history of both duplicity and failure to engage in any diplomacy over its nuclear program. The words craven, contemptible, and out of touch with any semblance of reality are just a few of the descriptive terms appropriate for that crowd.

3. This event clarifies, as well as any, Iran’s power structure when it comes to foreign policy and the acts of the IRGC. Ahmedinejad is a mouthpiece, nothing more. The person calling the shots is the Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei and his band of mad mullahs. It is quite interesting that Ahmedinejad was effectively muzzled by the mullahs throughout this whole event, until he was allowed before the camera's at the end to announce Iran's "grand gesture" of "good will."

4. Iran took this action likely in an attempt to rally support for their cause at home and abroad. They found neither. As the WP explained:

. . . Iran is also likely to pay a long-term price for the detention drama, again appearing to undertake rogue actions in violation of international law, experts and officials said. In the end, Iran recognized that the crisis was beginning to exact a cost, as it came under pressure even from allies and other Islamic countries, officials and experts said. Even Syria urged Iran to release the Britons, Syrian and U.S. sources said.

"They are so consumed with short-term issues -- how to undermine the West and how to gain leverage -- at the expense of long-term strategy. They have undermined themselves," said Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "They're playing the immediate moves of checkers and not the long-term strategy of a chess game. In the long term, it undermines their ability to attract foreign investment and have good relations" with the outside world.

Tehran was also unable to rally significant public support for another long-term showdown like the 1979-1981 hostage ordeal involving 52 American diplomats, experts added. "There was no nationalist bounce out of this," said Patrick Clawson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "All the usual people you'd expect to be frothing at the mouth simply weren't."

5. The USS Nimitz, a third U.S. Carrier Group, is enroute to the Persian Gulf at this moment. I am waiting to see if it acts as a replacement for one of the two carriers already in place, or adds another to their number. In any event, I think Iran made a tactical error with this one. Overall, the likelihood that Iran will face a military strike on its nuclear facilities and other strikes aimed at its economic infrastructure went up palpably with this hostage taking.

The EU –

The EU established their bona fides as worse then utterly useless by refusing to help one of their own members against a regime that ultimately threatens every one of the EU members themselves. See here. Also see Krauthammer today here. The EU holds the key to shutting down Iran, stopping their nuclear program in its tracks. And we hold the key to making the EU do that. I suggest we all start a campaign to convince the Republicans to dust off the Iran Freedom Support Act and see if we can’t sanction every EU and US foreign subsidiary doing business in Iran today. It would take political courage – something that seems in short supply these days beyond Bush and Lieberman – but it is the next logical step.

Britain

1. The Brit's are more then a little upset. This is a people who learn about Nelson and Trafalgar while still suckling at the tit, and they remember with pride Britain’s travelling half way around the world to spank Argentina when they tried to seize the Falklands. The majority, judging from the news coverage, are not in a mood to play games with Iran again. They are asking all of the right questions (See Updates here). Iran will never get another free shot at British soldiers, sailors or marines again.

2. What this means for Britain’s long term deployment in Basra, Iraq is an open question. Even as they draw down, it appears that Iran is picking up the pace of its actions in Basra. I do hope this gives the Brits the kick in the ass they need to become as deadly efficient in clearing out Basra of the mullah’s infestation as I know that they can be.

Overall:

The US needs to continue doing what it is doing in terms of targeting Iranians inside Iraq as well as seeking regime change inside Iran and hurting the mullahs everywhere else that they are weak. If anything, this event shows that Iran is feeling the heat -- which usually is a good sign that it would be appropriate to turn the heat up a lot more in the coming weeks.

Let's leave the final words to Amir Taheri, the Iranian author speaking in the UK's Times today:

The seizure of the British naval personnel is the latest episode in a low-intensity war that the Islamic Republic has waged against the West for almost three decades. In this war, Iran has killed hundreds of Western, especially American and French troops, in suicide attacks in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. More recently, its agents have killed at least 200 American troops and an unknown number of British soldiers in Iraq. Its influence against Nato in Afghanistan, against President Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan and against Lebanon and Israel, through Hezbollah and Hamas, are well known.

So far, the West’s response has been timid and occasional. The mullahs play a long-term game, acting as carpet-weavers, knotting one mischief at time, day in and day out. They know that their fragile regime, hated by a majority of Iranians, would not survive a full-scale clash with the West. This is why they deal their poison in small but steady doses, enough to weaken the foe but not too much to mobilise Western opinion in favour of full confrontation.

The debate on what to do about the mullahs hits a deadend because it is limited to two options: regime change or surrender. Those who blame the West for the world’s evils urge surrender, in atonement of sins supposedly committed against Iran over centuries. They hope that once the mullahs are given everything, they would start behaving reasonably. This argument ignores the fact that the Khomeinist regime’s political DNA would not allow it to act reasonably. A scorpion does not sting because it wants to misbehave but because it is programmed to do so.

When it comes to the regime-change option, the usual suspects who still cry for Saddam Hussein would be up in arms. President Ahmadinejad knows that no American or British leader can garner popular support for preemptive war against Iran.

The alternative, however, is not one of surrender or regime change. The Western democracies could give the Islamic republic a taste of its own medicine — and engage it in the kind of low-intensity warfare that Iran itself indulges in. The mischief must not be cost-free. It would be resisted though diplomatic and economic means as well as through support for the democratic and reformist forces inside Iran. Throughout history, adversaries end up by adopting aspects of each other’s strategy.

The Islamic Republic wants a Khomeinist Middle East. The “Infidel” want a democratic, pro-West Middle East. The two visions are incompatible. Eventually, one must win as the other loses. As the British celebrate the return of their hostages they would do well to decide which vision deserves support.

Read the entire article here.

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